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For almost thirty years, a new form of intellectual property has grown up quietly 
beneath the surface of societal observation.  It is a set of government-granted rights 
that have the quintessential characteristic of intellectual property and other forms of 
property—that is, the right to exclude others from the territory.1  
Beginning with a small piece of legislation in the early 1980s, the system now has 
tentacles stretching out in many directions.  It spans more than half a dozen smaller 
arrangements—established through individual pieces of congressional legislation or 
regulatory action—and confers hundreds of billions of dollars on those who can fold 
themselves within its various definitions.  Its impact on the United States health care 
system, in particular, is enormous.  In 2015 alone, more than 40 percent of all new 
drugs approved by the Federal Drug Administration (the “FDA”) came through just 
one of these portals, with the companies collecting regulatory property rights along 
the way.2  
Some forms of this regulatory property are quasi-patent.  In the same way that 
patents grant the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention, 
these types of regulatory property grant the right to exclude others from entering into 
the market; in many cases, for a significant period of time.  Other forms are quasi-
trade secret.  For example, trade secret prevents others from improperly accessing 
and using a competitor’s information, although one can develop that information on 
one’s own.  Similarly, some forms of this regulatory property allow a company to 
exclude others from using its research data for a period of time, although others could 
develop the same research data on their own.  Finally, some forms of this regulatory 
property are more like pure personal property, in that these benefits can be sold or 
traded on the open market.  
Across the various forms, these pieces of regulatory property—or one could call 
them Regulatory Property—have life spans that range from six months to three, five, 
or even seven years.  They can interact with or be added to the patent term length, 
and they can be added on to each other.  In short, the system is extraordinarily 
complex and largely unnoticed, outside of the industry and its participants, although 
some elements occasionally surface in the press.3 
Creation of this system follows no theoretical design.  Sprawling and incremental, 
it has grown by accretion as various groups have succeeded in making good 
arguments that they, too, should have a benefit.  Accidental property is always a 
dangerous form for society to create.  Property created by accident lacks the 
thoughtful and considered exploration that provides the only hope of theoretical 
coherence within the legal system.  When accidental property combines with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing the right to exclude 
others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights” that is property).  See also Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 
(1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987). 
 2. See Michael G. Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act:  Restoring the Mission to Rare Diseases, 
39 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210, 210-11 (2016); John Jenkins, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CDER 
Approved Many Innovative Drugs in 2014, FDA VOICE (Jan. 14, 2015), available at 
https://perma.cc/4D5Y-JDDU.	  
 3. See, e.g., Ted M. Burns et al., Editorial by Concerned Physicians:  Unintended Effect of the 
Orphan Drug Act on the Potential Cost of 3,4-Diaminopyridine, 53 MUSCLE NERVE 165, 166-67 (2016).  
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system that is largely hidden from view, the danger intensifies.  
Intellectual property rights that are hidden from view risk undermining the basic 
theoretical premise of the U.S. intellectual property system.  Our British ancestors 
may have granted letters patent as private favors for those who could curry them, but 
not the United States.  This nation’s intellectual property system—particularly the 
patent system—is firmly rooted in notions of neutral requirements for what 
constitutes a sufficient contribution to society that one can receive rights for limited 
times and limited purposes.  A hidden labyrinth of regulatory property, however, 
could easily become a system of private bills, in which individual companies are able 
to bargain for favors in a way that is hidden from public view.  And there are certainly 
scattered examples that have that flavor.  For example, the threshold level for one of 
the forms of regulatory property—orphan drug rights—was an arbitrary number 
based on the estimated prevalence of narcolepsy and multiple sclerosis over thirty 
years ago.4  In other words, a remarkably powerful form of regulatory property was 
designed in a way that ensured two particular drugs would fit. 
As regulatory property plays an increasingly important role in innovation and in 
society, it is essential to recognize all of its various tendrils as a single system—a 
new form of property within the intellectual property domain.  Treating regulatory 
property in its rightful place among the pantheon of intellectual property rights 
allows appropriate analysis of the interactions among these powerful forces.  It isn’t 
just a matter of labeling these phenomena as forms of property.  It is a matter of 
understanding and making sense out of them as a coherent whole, as well as making 
sense of how they interact with other types of rights to exclude, such as patent and 
trade secret.  
To frame the conversation, the title of this article references one of the most 
influential articles of the last century,5 The New Property, by Charles Reich.  
Concerned about the rise of the regulatory state, Reich argued that the various 
permissions and benefits conferred by the government should be understood as forms 
of property.6  Reich was worried about protecting those who receive the benefits from 
being bullied by the government.  He called for benefit recipients to have small 
sovereign islands of their own,7 that is, protection against the encroaching power of 
the government that may be exercised in the process of granting or withholding of 
benefits.8  
While Reich was worried about protecting those who obtain benefits, this Article 
below is concerned about the rest of society.  When government creates this type of 
quasi-property, along with its surrounding islands of protection, what geologic 
territory is left for the remainder of its citizens?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 4. See DEP’T of HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., infra note 53, at 4.  
 5. David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1779 (2013). 
 6. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964). 
 7. See id. at 774 (noting that “[t]he great error of the public interest state is that it assumes an 
identity between the public interest and the interest of the majority”).  
 8. Reich’s article led to the development of due process rights for those who receive government 
benefits.  See Super, supra note 5, at 1780 (discussing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) which 
relied on Reich to recognize welfare benefits as property interests protected by the due process clause). 
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Consider the general construct of granting intellectual property rights, such as 
patents.  From the activities that would ordinarily be enjoyed by all, the government 
removes some and appropriates them to the benefit of the few, in the hopes that the 
strategy will redound to the advantage of everyone.9  The same is true for Regulatory 
Property, and one cannot properly evaluate whether those benefits are accomplishing 
their intended goals without understanding the system as a whole and understanding 
its interactions with other forms of intellectual property  
Although one could argue over whether regulatory property should exist, society 
rarely succeeds in turning back the tide.  Thus, the better part of valor would be to 
make sense of the system that has grown around us, understanding and enhancing its 
positive aspects while cabining its negative ones.  Only if we contemplate regulatory 
property as a single, unified organism, however, can we wrap our arms around it and 
make sense out of the whole. 
To that end, Section I of this Article begins by analyzing the various forms of 
regulatory property10 that have emerged over the last thirty years according to their 
similarity to other types of intellectual property—such as patent and trade secret—
and to property in general.  Section II then examines the emergence of this 
Regulatory Property, identifying the history of each one and creating the first 
complete accounting of all of them.  This Section also demonstrates the relationship 
between the myriad congressional bills creating these regulatory properties and 
passage of major legislation that the pharmaceutical industry resisted.  In other 
words, Congress appears to have responded repeatedly to pharmaceutical industry 
displeasure by passing scattered bills that would grant new forms of Regulatory 
Property.  
If Regulatory Property should be understood as a unified system, one must have 
some theoretical grounding for its existence.  Without a coherent construct, there is 
no way to intelligently shape its development and test its success.  Thus, Section III 
of the paper sets out a general theoretical framework for the type of regulatory 
property that has emerged.  This Section also explores a series of benchmarks to use 
in establishing Regulatory Property, describing the logic for these benchmarks, and 
tests the current forms of Regulatory Property against these measures.  The 
benchmarks include:  (1) minimizing overlap with other forms of intellectual 
property; (2) ensuring that the system is capable of stimulating results, and that those 
results are desirable; and (3) ensuring that there is a metric for measuring outcomes 
in relationship to goals.  With these and other perspectives, society has an opportunity 
to think critically and cohesively about the new form of intellectual property that has 
developed incrementally over the last several decades. 
The Regulatory Property that has emerged so far falls within the life science 
industry.  That is understandable.  The FDA’s all encompassing approval scheme 
and regulatory system has provided a perfect vehicle for the creation and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9. Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 310, 318 (2013).	  
 10. This Article’s use of the term Regulatory Property is in contrast to the use of the term by Anna 
Laakmann.  Laakmann uses the term to refer to information necessary to satisfy a regulatory standard, and 
appropriate to include in a submission to a regulatory agency.  See Anna Laakmann, A Property Theory 
of Medical Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 119 (2016). 
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dissemination of Regulatory Property.  The lessons, however, are widely applicable 
to other innovative industries.  As newcomers in industries such as transportation 
(think Uber and Lyft), hospitality (think Airbnb and Villas),11 and domestic and 
construction services (think TaskRabbit) press the boundaries of creativity up against 
regulatory networks, government actors may be tempted to create forms of 
Regulatory Property related to these innovations, in the hopes of incentivizing 
innovative entrants as well as placating existing industry players.  For example, local, 
state, or federal authorities might try to attract an industry, such as solar energy 
innovation, devising benefits for new entrants balanced against protections for 
existing energy industries.  Such is the story of the creation of Regulatory Property 
for the life science industry, and it is one that easily could be replicated.  
It is also a story with echoes in the international arena.  Various aspects of these 
rights have tentacles that now reach into the European Union, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, and most recently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.12  Thus, 
after thirty years, it is more than time to think comprehensively about this new form 
of intellectual property rights, a regime that lies entwined throughout our system. 
I.  THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
There is nothing sacred about the current contours of intellectual property as a 
legal discipline.  Although patents and copyrights trace their heritage back to the 
Constitution,13 the concept of intellectual property as a unified field developed more 
recently, emerging in its current incarnation largely in the 1980s.14  In fact, one can 
see its emergence through a Google Ngrams graph, a search result that charts the 
frequency with which a particular term appears in books across a designated time 
period.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11. Stephanie Rosenbloom, Giving Airbnb a Run for Its Money, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2015), 
available at https://perma.cc/M22G-MAF5. 
 12. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International 
Intellectual Property Law:  The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 
6-8 (2009) (discussing the spread of protection for data rights, described as clinical trial data, through 
international, regional, and bilateral trade agreements); see also Brook K. Baker, Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Provisions in Intellectual Property, Transparency, and Investment Chapters Threaten Access 
to Medicines in the US and Elsewhere, 13 PLOS MED. 3, 3-4 (2016) (explaining TPP provisions requiring 
countries to adopt data and marketing exclusivity restrictions for pharmaceutical products involving new 
chemical entities and for biologics). 	  
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”). 
 14.  See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 
HANDBOOK (2007) (discussing the modern era of intellectual property, beginning in the 1980s); see also 
Benjamin Coriat & Olivier Weinstein, Intellectual Property Right Regimes, Firms, and the 
Commodification of Knowledge, 5 CLPE RES. PAPER 3, 12-14 (2009) (outlining the emergence of a new 
intellectual property regime in the 1980s accompanying the rise of finance-led capitalism); see also 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
(2004) (describing growth in intellectual property protection in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 15. For an explanation of Google Ngrams, see https://perma.cc/32HW-KUYG. 
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Figure 1.16 
 
As the graph suggests, the designation of intellectual property as a unified field 
did not appear with any frequency until the 1980s.  As described in Section II below, 
Regulatory Property emerged during the same time period, although it has remained 
strangely absent from conventional discussion.  Rather, intellectual property is 
defined as including only copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret.17 
Although the term “intellectual property” harkens back to traditional notions of 
property within the legal system, the characteristics of property and intellectual 
property diverge considerably.  To take a simple example, if I plant corn on an 
ordinary piece of land, you cannot plant corn there as well, and even my own ability 
to plant corn will diminish over time as the nutrients in the land are depleted.  In 
contrast, you and I can both sing a song at the same time, and we can sing it over and 
over again without depleting much more than the patience of our families.18 
Despite valiant efforts across time to equate some forms of intellectual property 
with property such as land, intellectual property defies that categorization.19  It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 16. To generate this graph, see https://perma.cc/2JTQ-NN8P.  I thank Carl Shapiro’s presentation 
at the American Economic Association 2016 Annual Meeting for the idea of using Google Ngrams to map 
the use of various intellectual property terms.	  	  
 17. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1B (3d ed. 
2015) (describing patents, trade secrets, copyright, and trademarks as the four major intellectual property 
rights).  
 18. For less lighthearted discussions of the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property, including 
the economic implications of zero marginal cost of production of intellectual property, see, e.g., Kenneth 
J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION 
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Richard Nelson, ed., 1962) (presenting 
this argument); Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:  Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(responding to Arrow); see also Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price:  Why and How to Get Beyond 
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974-76 (comparing and contrasting Arrow and 
Demsetz). 
 19. See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 9-33 (2012) (exploring the ways in which 
patents are not analogous to land); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. (2004) (describing Edmund Kitch’s comparison of patents to mineral claims for land and noting 
that while Kitch’s theory represents one of the most significant efforts to integrate intellectual property 
with property rights theory, it has been criticized as without foundation and divorced from reality); see 
also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., et. al. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 848	  (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting) 
(explaining that the Anglo-American legal tradition has long distinguished between core private rights 
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neither tangible nor finite in nature, beyond the duration of the government-granted 
legal right.20  Moreover, the boundaries of intellectual property must be set in the 
face of rapidly changing knowledge and meaning, as inventions and creations are 
compared to things that did not exist when protected invention or work was created.21  
Thus, the process of creating efficient divisions for things of such an unbounded 
nature will involve quite different considerations from the process for efficient 
division of the more bounded, regardless of the meandering path that the bounded 
may take.22  
Nevertheless, the various legal rights for intellectual property share significant 
characteristics with rights related to property, including the right to exclude others.23  
These will become important in comparing intellectual property rights with the 
emerging Regulatory Property.  
As described in Section II below,24 most forms of Regulatory Property were 
created by Congress and operate through the FDA.  Although the different forms 
may combine several types of rights, the rights generally fall into three baskets.  The 
baskets include marketing rights, data rights, and tradeable rights like priority review.  
Most of these look like revised forms of other intellectual property rights.  They have 
the feel of having been created by market actors who, after living with certain types 
of intellectual property and regulatory systems, adjusted existing forms to better fit 
their needs. 
A.  MARKETING RIGHTS—QUASI-PATENTS 
The first basket consists of marketing rights, that is, all others are excluded from 
receiving permission to market the product for a period of time.  For example, if a 
drug company approved by the FDA contains a new chemical entity, the FDA cannot 
grant approval for any other company to market a drug containing the same chemical 
entity for five years.  
Marketing rights can be analogized to patent rights.25  With patents, one has the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
such as those related to land and other privileges, and that patents fall outside those core private rights); 
Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 567 (2007) (cited in the 
Teva dissent); Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment & Patents:  The Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 30, 71-72 (2016) (contrasting the respect for real property	   evidenced in 
Constitutional language and history with what is reflected in the Constitution’s intellectual property 
clause). 
 20. FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 32; see also Reich, supra note 6, at 739 (noting that while wealth 
and value are created by culture and society, property is a creation of law in that a man who has property 
has certain legal rights with respect to an item of wealth).	  
 21. See FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 3.  
 22. See id. at 32. 
 23. Despite frequent slips of the tongue by courts and commentators, patents do not grant any 
positive rights, but only the right to exclude.  For examples of such errors, see, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. 
Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Brief for Respondent, at 34, Ill. Tool Works Inc. 
v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.  28 (2006) (No. 04–1329); Henry C. Su, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Market Power, 877 PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Ser. 135, 
144 n.22 (2006). 
 24. See Section II, infra.	  
 25. See infra note 50, for authors who have referred to various types of the benefits in regulatory 
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right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention.  With 
marketing rights, others are similarly excluded from selling the product on the 
market. 
Although marketing rights are focused on selling in the market, they are somewhat 
stronger than ordinary patent rights.  First, patent rights are not self-executing.  No 
district attorney, no federal agency will step forward to champion a patent holder’s 
rights.  If a patent holder wishes to exercise its right to exclude someone from selling 
the product, the patent holder must bring a lawsuit.  In contrast, when a company 
receives marketing rights, the FDA enforces those rights by refusing to grant 
approval to any other company.26 
The second difference relates to a popular misconception about the power of 
patent rights.  For those who are not patent mavens, this is a good moment to hold 
onto your hats.  It would be easy to assume that a patent grants the right to a circle 
of territory, and all others are excluded from that circle.  Such is not the case.  The 
patent does, indeed, grant the right to exclude others from a circle of territory, but 
that does not mean the patent holder controls the entire circle alone.  Others have 
may have exclusion rights to parts of the same circle. 
Consider the following example, adapted from discoveries at the University of 
Rochester.27  An inventor obtains a patent on a chemical dye for coloring candy a 
bright shade of blue.  Under what is known as the one embodiment rule, the patent 
holder who identifies one use for the chemical can claim rights to all uses of the 
chemical.28  A later inventor discovers that the dye is useful for treating spinal cord 
injuries.  The second inventor can receive a patent on the new use of the existing 
chemical for spinal cord research and treatment.29  At this point, the first inventor has 
the right to exclude everyone from using the chemical for anything (including spinal 
cord research and treatment); the second inventor has the right to exclude everyone 
from using the chemical for spinal cord research and treatment; and neither can use 
the chemical for spinal cord research and treatment without the permission of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rights as patent-like.  
 26. For a discussion of this aspect of FDA marketing exclusivities in the context of Hohfeldian 
immunities and disabilities, see Yaniv Heled, Patents v. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological 
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 431 (2012). 
 27. See FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 24 (describing these circumstances and the patent example and 
sources in further detail); see also Same Blue Dye in M&Ms Linked to Reducing Spinal Injury, CNN (July 
28, 2009), https://perma.cc/6PAK-G4MP (describing work in mice at the University of Rochester, 
demonstrating that the blue dye used in M&M candy appears to reduce damage caused by spinal cord 
injuries when injected into the spinal cord).	  
 28. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946); Maurer v. Dickerson, 
113 F. 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1902) (finding “that the claim is not restricted to the product made by the 
described process, but covers the chemical individual, however produced”); Utility Examination 
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001) (noting that “[a] patent on a composition gives 
exclusive rights to the composition for a limited time, even if the inventor disclosed only a single use”); 
see also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that it is not 
necessary that a patent application test all embodiments of an invention); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 
503 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (same). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“or any new and useful improvement thereof ”). See, e.g., Allegheny  Drop 
Forge Co. v. Portec Inc., 541 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1976) (“A new use for an old process or product is 
patentable if the new use or application is itself not ‘obvious’ to one skilled in the art.”). 
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other.30  This is the case of overlapping rights, and although most patents do not 
overlap, it is a limitation of the power of the patent.  In short, the patent holder does, 
indeed, obtain the right to exclude others from a circle of territory.  Nevertheless, 
others may be standing in parts of that circle with their own rights to exclude, 
effectively shrinking the patent holder’s practical sphere of operations. 
Marketing rights are different in some circumstances.  When a company qualifies 
for marketing rights under some forms of Regulatory Property, the company gets an 
affirmative right to market the drug, along with rights that may operate as a blanket 
exclusion of all other companies for all uses.31  Unlike patent rights, therefore, you 
get to ensure that no others will be standing in the circle with you, and the federal 
government does the work of enforcing your rights. 
 B.  DATA RIGHTS—QUASI TRADE SECRETS 
The second category relates to data rights, in which other companies are prevented 
from using one’s safety and efficacy data that were submitted to regulatory 
authorities and used as a basis for granting approval.  For example, a company 
wishing to make a generic version of a drug will be prevented from using the original 
company’s data for a period of time, although the generic company could conduct its 
own safety and efficacy trials during that time.32  
The right to generate one’s own safety and efficacy data, however, is unlikely to 
be an attractive pathway.33  Safety and efficacy trials are lengthy and expensive.  
Generic companies, trying to enter the market quickly and cheaply, are generally 
loath to follow that path.  Thus, they are somewhat stronger than trade secrets.  Data 
rights are also stronger than trade secret rights in another manner.  With trade secrets, 
the right is lost when the information is no longer secret.34  With regulatory data 
rights, the right continues, regardless of whether the information is released to the 
public.   
Data rights can be analogized to trade secrets.  Under trade secret law, a company 
would be entitled to protect information that would give it a commercial advantage 
over competitors, as long as that information is not readily ascertainable to others in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 30. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, vol. 5, §16.02 (2010) (“Two patents may be valid 
when the second is an improvement on the first, in which event, if the second includes the first, neither of 
the two patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other without the other’s consent.”  (quoting 
Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 694 (1886))).	  
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 170-181 (describing a program created in 2012 for pediatric 
studies that extends exclusivities, including marketing rights, for all uses and formulations of a drug); text 
accompanying notes 125-133 (describing ways in which	  marketing rights for orphan drugs operate to 
block valuable off-label uses of a drug, in addition to the orphan indication).	  	  
 32. See John R. Thomas, The Role of Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities in Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 4 (Jan. 7, 2013) (describing data exclusivity, or the “data package,” 
submitted by brand-name firms and the ways in which this may be used by generic firms), available at 
https://perma.cc/Y8K6-2CJE. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See 1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.05, 2 (2015) (noting that once 
information becomes publicly disclosed or readily available, it forfeits its trade secret status).	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the field.35  Competitors who developed the information on their own, however, 
would be free to use it.  
The treatment of independent creation under trade secret law, as well as with data 
rights, stands in contrast to patent law.  No one can use another’s patented invention, 
even when that invention is created independently.36  
Data rights are more limited than trade secrets, at least in duration.  Trade secret 
protection essentially lasts as long as the information remains a secret.  Data rights, 
however, are granted only for a limited period of time.  
From this perspective, data rights can be analogized to a cousin of trade secret 
rights, non-compete clauses, in which departing employees may be prevented from 
working for competitors for a period of time.37  Unlike trade secret protection, non-
compete clauses are for limited duration.38  They also are agnostic as to whether the 
information that is being protected might be secret or in the public domain.39 
The data rights time period is related to a Congressional choice to require that 
pharmaceutical companies make their safety and efficacy data available to those who 
would make lower-cost versions of the drug once the patent protection ends.  The 
data sharing system is part of a complex legislative scheme designed to get generics 
to market as quickly as possible and to encourage would-be generic companies to 
challenge weak patents in court.40  Thus, the data rights time period ensures a certain 
length of protection for the original drug maker’s data under all circumstances, even 
if the generic will eventually succeed in overturning the patent.  
From one perspective, one can think of data rights as a pure grant of benefits to 
pharmaceutical companies—given that data rights have the potential to confer 
protection to a drug company, even when the company’s patents are invalid or 
expired.  From another perspective, one can think of data rights as a compromise:  
trade secret protection would give drug company’s an indefinite length of protection 
for their data, pure sharing would provide no data protection, and data rights provide 
a level of protection somewhere between the two. 
C.  TRADEABLE RIGHTS—QUASI PROPERTY 
The third basket of rights that may be granted with Regulatory Property relates to 
tradeable rights.  In most cases, rights that are granted with Regulatory Property are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 35. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1.4 (1985).  
 36. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974) (finding that the patent right 
applies not only to direct copies of the subject matter, but also independent creations). 
 37. See DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW § 3.2 
(2016) (defining a non-compete clause as “an employment agreement whereby the employee agrees not 
to compete with his employer after termination of his employment for a specified period of time and in a 
particular area”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a Category of Intellectual 
Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 90 (noting that a departing employee is prohibited 
from using both trade secrets and public domain or generally known information in competition).  
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 59-68.  See also Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug 
Wars:  A New Generation of Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499 (2016) (describing in 
detail the mechanisms of the Hatch-Waxman Act).	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specific to the drug going through the approval process.  In some cases, however, a 
company that engages in the desired behavior receives a right fully stripped from the 
drug.  For example, a company that secures a tropical disease voucher receives the 
right to move a second drug application more quickly through the FDA review 
system in some form.41  The company can use that right on another one of its drugs, 
or it can transfer the right to another company.  The ability to freely trade the right 
makes these benefits analogous to ordinary property rights, which, in general, enjoy 
the right of transfer.42  
Even without an explicit right of transfer, the benefit of any Regulatory Property 
is a tradeable economic benefit, to some extent.  One could always sell the company, 
transferring the economic value of the right along with it.  The benefit might not 
transfer to another drug, but the overall economic value of the benefit from one drug 
transfers to the entire operation, as with any corporate asset.  
Moreover, there may be more direct ways in which Regulatory Property granted 
to one drug can be transferred to another drug.  Consider drug pricing in the context 
of what are known as pharmacy benefit mangers.  Pharmacy benefit managers are 
third-party managers who negotiate pricing between pharmaceutical companies and 
large purchasers such as hospitals, private health insurance companies (such as 
Kaiser or Cigna), drugstore chains (such as Walgreen’s or CVS), or government 
health plans (such as Medicare and Medicaid).43  A drug company like Merck will 
work with the pharmacy benefit manager for Kaiser; for example, to negotiate the 
prices Kaiser will pay on all of Merck’s drugs.44  As a result, pricing in the 
pharmaceutical industry is no longer drug specific in many cases.  
Such bulk pricing could provide the opportunity for drug companies to use the 
power of benefits granted in one drug to effect the pricing of other drugs.45  For 
example, suppose the company’s drug Life Extender is facing competition from new 
substitutes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203.   
 42. But see, Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway?  Human Cells and the Strange Effects of 
Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1382-83 (2011) (noting that although 
modern property law scholars think of property as a bundle of rights with four key attributes, including 
the right of disposition, those rights may be circumscribed, and using medicine as an example in which 
the right to transfer and even to throw away may be restricted).	  	  	  
 43. See Allison D. Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit 
Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 33-80 (2007) (describing the structure of the PBM	  industry); 
see also Robert F. Atlas,	  The Role of PBMs in Implementing the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 
HEALTH AFF., 504-15 (2004) (explaining the expanded role of PBMs created by the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which relies upon PBMs to administer the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit). 
 44. See Garrett & Garis, supra note 43, at 45 (describing how drug manufacturers insist on bundling 
drugs and providing aggregate pricing, precluding negotiations on a drug-by-drug basis); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, Pharmacy Benefit Managers:  Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies (Aug. 2005), 
https://perma.cc/T4JZ-N9UU (noting that pharmaceutical manufacturers can make “formulary payments” 
to PBMs to have their drug listed on a formulary or obtain a preferred spot on a formulary and can make 
“market-share payments” to encourage PBMs to dispense their drugs, with payment based on the quantity 
of drugs administered). 
 45. See Garrett & Garis, supra note 43, at 44-46 (describing how pharmaceutical manufacturers 
use PBMs to increase market share for specific drugs).  
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Now suppose the company has obtained Regulatory Property on another drug, 
SleepAid.  This could be marketing rights, for example, that will keep any other 
company from getting approval to market SleepAid for five years.  The company 
could offer to lower the cost of SleepAid somewhat, without fear of attracting 
competition for the drug, in exchange for the pharmaceutical benefit manager 
agreeing to keep Life Extender in the hospital’s standard list of drugs that it stocks.  
A similar deal could be offered to insurers to get a reduced rate for the well-protected 
SleepAid in exchange for keeping the more vulnerable Life Extender on the insurer’s 
formulary of approved drugs that it will either reimburse, reimburse at the lower-
deductible rate, or agree to fill without extra layers of approval.  Techniques such as 
these could be particularly effective against younger market entrants who do not have 
as many goodies in their bags with which to bargain.46  In this way, the drug company 
can transfer the benefit it has received from Regulatory Property on one drug to the 
benefit of another drug.  Thus, while some Regulatory Property is explicitly 
tradeable, the benefit of any Regulatory Property may be transferrable in more subtle 
ways.  
The transferability of Regulatory Property highlights the importance of 
contemplating these rights as a whole, as well as understanding the way in which 
they interact with other forms of intellectual property.  The Regulatory Property 
benefits described above can be combined with other forms of intellectual property, 
such as patents, to extend or enhance the benefits that would be gained under 
traditional intellectual property alone.47  For example, a company that receives 
marketing rights for an orphan drug can use those rights to exclude other entrants 
from the market, even if the company’s patents have expired.  Those marketing rights 
can be added on to other forms of exclusivity, such as pediatric exclusivity.  In other 
words, the various forms of Regulatory Property can be added to each other and to 
patents to extend a company’s ability to ensure protected market space. 
The following section will introduce the various forms of Regulatory Property.  
Each has been created in the hopes of incentivizing certain behaviors that society 
deems valuable.  Implicit or explicit in each is the supposition that ordinary market 
incentives would be insufficient or that market failures would operate to prevent the 
desired outcome without the incentive that the Regulatory Property would provide.48  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 46. For a discussion of the ways in which other types of bulk pricing schemes can be used to deter 
market entrants, see Robin Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1999). 
 47. See, e.g., Renu Lal, Patents & Exclusivity, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION AND RES. SMALL BUS. AND INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE CHRONS. 1, 3 (May 19, 2015),	  
https://perma.cc/CZA5-9PR6 (explaining that the six-month exclusivity for first generic filers may run 
concurrently with patents).  
 48. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 347-48 (describing how deficiencies in the patent system have led FDA-
granted exclusivities to become an increasingly important incentive for innovation); Valérie Junod, Drug 
Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 481-85 
(2004) (characterizing marketing exclusivity as a solution to cases of market failure, such as when a 
pharmaceutical company discovers that a potentially promising drug in development cannot be patented); 
Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation under Follow-On Biologics Legislation: FDA Exclusivity 
as an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 93, 100-06 (2010) (arguing in favor 
of FDA-administered exclusivities as a mean of promoting biologics innovation without the pitfalls of the 
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
2016] REGULATORY PROPERTY:  THE NEW IP 65	  
In some cases, the desired behavior is the creation of lower cost generic or biosimilar 
drugs.  In others, the goal is to challenge weak patents.  In others, the desired behavior 
is investing in certain types of drug testing or drug creation when market incentives 
might not be sufficiently strong.  Society cannot hope to evaluate the effectiveness 
of these initiatives or to measure them against externalities without understanding 
the system as a whole and examining the ways in which Regulatory Property interacts 
with other types of rights.  
II.  HISTORY AND TAXONOMY OF REGULATORY PROPERTY  
The Regulatory Property described in this article first emerged in the 1980s,49 with 
newer forms appearing periodically over the subsequent thirty years.  Although the 
term “Intellectual Property” also emerged during the early 1980s, Regulatory 
Property generally has been left out of the broader intellectual property calculus.50   
It is challenging, if not downright impossible, to find a clear and comprehensive 
explanation in any given location of all of the forms of Regulatory Property.51  What 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
traditional patent system).  
 49. See Thomas, supra note 32. 
 50. When they are grouped together, although often incompletely, they are described as regulatory 
exclusivities or named by reference to some subtype of right, such as data exclusivity.  See, e.g., Thomas, 
supra note 32 (using the term “regulatory exclusivities”); Lal, supra note 47; Erica Lietzan, The Myths of 
Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 104 (2015) (focusing on “data exclusivity”).  Some 
scholars and commentators have referred in passing to these benefits as patent-like or a form of intellectual 
property.  See Lietzan, supra at 104 (noting that some writers have described data exclusivity as patent-
like or a sub-type of intellectual property); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa L. Ouellette, Beyond the 
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 309, 316-25 (2013) (noting that the authors group regulatory 
exclusivities and patents together as ex post, market-set, user pays mechanisms); Thomas, supra note 32, 
at 12-13 (describing regulatory exclusivities as a more recent form of intellectual property); see also 
Eisenberg, supra note 48 at 360 (describing “FDA administered proprietary rights in regulatory data”); 
Robert Alan Hess, Excavating Treasure from the Amber of the Prior Art:  Why the Public Benefit Doctrine 
is Ill-Suited to the Pharmaceutical Sciences, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105 (2011) (referring to “pseudo-
patents”); JAY THOMAS, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Exclusivities, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 345 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds. Oxford 2014) (noting that regulatory 
exclusivities can “fairly be described as the newest form of intellectual property”); Trudo Lemmens & 
Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials 
Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 84-85 (2012) (referring to data exclusivities as “patent-style 
protection”).  
 51. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 4 (noting that regulatory exclusivities are not subject to a 
standard terminology and that regrettably some commentators use terms such as “statutory exclusivity,” 
“data protection,” and “marketing exclusivity” synonymously with the term “regulatory exclusivity”); 
Lietzan, supra note 50, at 12-13 (noting confusing uses of various terms).  One particularly useful 
document can be found at the FDA website, which lists five forms of what it calls “exclusivity.”  This 
listing does not include all of Regulatory Property, omitting the various tradeable rights, and includes 
various types of data rights such as rights related to New Chemical Entities within what it describes as 
“marketing rights granted by the FDA upon approval of the drug.”  See Lal, supra note 47.  Other excellent 
sources include some, but not all of the various forms described here.  See e.g., Yaniv Heled, Regulatory 
Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015) (presenting a comprehensive taxonomy, but one that 
does not include the rare pediatric vouchers and the tropical disease vouchers); Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity 
Without Patents:  The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 
1448-53 (describing new chemical entity rights but not the similar new clinical studies rights); Aaron S. 
Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical Innovation, 363 N. ENGL. 
J. MED. 1855 (2010) (discussing a number of regulatory exclusivity benefits but not including new 
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, 40 COLUM. L.J. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
66 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [40:1	  
is even more challenging, however, is to find any inkling of the historic context in 
which they emerged—and that history is significant.  Many of the forms of 
Regulatory Property were created during periods of time when Congress passed 
legislation that the pharmaceutical industry vigorously opposed.52  In other words, 
repeatedly over the last thirty years, legislators have approved the creation of some 
form of Regulatory Property in the same Congress in which the legislators garnered 
enough votes to pass major laws that the industry resisted.  
Other changes have occurred across the thirty years.  Congress has amended the 
various Acts in ways that expanded, or occasionally contracted, the reach of the 
Regulatory Property that had been created.53  Similarly, courts and regulatory 
authorities have, at times, re-interpreted aspects of the statute to create a broader 
reach for Regulatory Property rights holders.54  Nevertheless, the trend of creation of 
Regulatory Property in conjunction with swallowing a bitter bill is striking. 
To highlight this history, the Article will introduce the forms of Regulatory 
Property grouped together in their historic context.  In addition, Appendix A includes 
a chart for visualizing all of the forms of Regulatory Property and their relationships. 
A.  REGULATORY PROPERTY WITH THE CREATION OF THE GENERICS PATHWAY 
Regulatory Property was born with the passage of the famous Hatch-Waxman 
Act, which created the modern pathway for approval of generic drugs.  Several forms 
passed as part of the massive Hatch-Waxman Act itself in 1983.  These include 
marketing rights for the first generic company, data rights for new chemical entities, 
and various forms of data rights for new clinical studies.55 
In the same Congress, legislators passed a bill related to marketing rights for what 
is known as “orphan drugs.”56  Although the original Orphan Drug Act had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
chemical entities, new clinical studies, biologic interchangeables, and QDIP exclusivities); see Thomas, 
supra note 32 (one of the more exhaustive lists but not discussing tropical disease vouchers); Emily 
Morris, Patent Exclusivity Versus Regulatory Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Act 34-35 (Ind. Univ. 
Robert H. McKinney Sch. Of Law, Research Paper No. 2012-30), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185180 (focusing on Hatch-Waxman provisions, 
and thus, no discussion of biologic interchangeables, QDIP exclusivities, and tropical disease vouchers). 
 52. See infra text accompanying notes 70, 138-139. 
 53. For example, although the Orphan Drug Act passed in 1983, it was amended in 1984 (loosened 
the definition of rare disease), 1985 (extended to patentable as well as unpatentable drugs), 1988 (required 
applicants to apply for orphan drug status before applying for marketing approval), and 1997 (application 
user fees exempted).  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., The 
Orphan Drug Act: Implementation and Impact, 4 (May 2001), https://perma.cc/8PFF-L5KW. 
 54. David Hoffmeister, et al., Top FDA Developments of 2015 and Predictions for 2016, LAW360 
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/J234-XR57 (noting that the FDA, in response to actions related to 
Amarin’s drug Vascepa, in 2015 changed its interpretation of New Chemical Entity to say that drugs 
which contain, as their sole active ingredient, a single component of a previously approved 
multicomponent mixture are entitled to 5 year exclusivity); see also Vern Norviel, et al., Amarin Decision 
Opens Door to Longer Exclusivity Periods, LAW360 (June 12, 2015, 2:06 PM), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/665186/amarin-decision-opens-door-to-longer-exclusivity-periods.  
 55. See infra, text accompanying notes 65-81. 
 56. See David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: 
A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 367-68 (2005) (explaining the origins 
of the term “orphan drugs”).  
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signed into law during the prior Congress, the Act did not stimulate much interest 
until the changes made during the Hatch-Waxman Congress.57  In short, the 1983-
1984 Congress set the stage for the system of Regulatory Property, along with its 
central role in modern drug development.  
Together, the Regulatory Property created through the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
the 1984 Orphan Drug Act Amendments account for a remarkable portion of the 
medicines developed by the pharmaceutical industry, approved by the FDA, and 
available on the market today.  For example, orphan drugs accounted for 41 percent 
of drugs approved by the FDA in 2014.58  
1.  Hatch-Waxman 
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which the President signed into law in 1984, created the 
modern pathway for expedited approval of generic drugs.59  The law reflects the 
desire to bring lower-priced drugs to consumers as quickly as possible after the 
patents expire, balanced against the need to ensure adequate incentives for 
pharmaceutical research and development.  Specifically, the patent system provides 
a twenty-year right to exclude for the invention of new drugs that are sufficiently 
innovative to receive patent protection.60  Patent theory holds that during this time, 
the drug company should be able to recoup its investment in the discovery and 
development of the drug through the elevated pricing that can occur without direct 
competitors in the market.  When the patent expires, however, other drug makers 
should be able to enter the market and drive down the price of the drug.  
What works in patent theory does not always work in practice.  Those who would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 57. See id. at 375 (explaining reasons why drug companies were reluctant to file orphan drug 
applications with the FDA until the 1984 amendments to the Act).	  	  
 58. See Daniel et. al., supra note 2, at 1; see also OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, CTR. FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, 2015 ANNUAL OGD ANNUAL REPORT:  ENSURING SAFE, EFFECTIVE AND 
AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 10, (2015), https://perma.cc/R7P9-4YYD.  The 
FDA reports that the Office of Generic Drugs awarded 580 approvals and 146 tentative	  approvals in 2015.  
That year, there were 45 novel drugs approved.  Thus, excluding the tentative generic approvals, 92.8% 
of drugs approved in 2015 were generics.  Of the 7.2% of approved drugs that were novel drugs, 
approximately 47% of those were orphan drugs. 
 59. Known colloquially as the Hatch-Waxman Act for the legislators who crafted the law, the 
formal name is the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (1984) (hereinafter, “Hatch-Waxman Act”).  For a detailed description of the Act, along with other 
sources discussing Hatch-Waxman, see Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 40.  See also, Elizabeth S. 
Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 585, 585–90 (2003); FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 158; WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT R41114, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 
(2011), http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview 
:pdfevent?pgId=06b6d75e-812a-4075-accc-84ebb14f0182&rsId=156CF64E551&pdf=/app-bin/gis-
congresearch/f/a/7/8/crs-2011-rsi-0151_from_1_to_20.pdf;	   Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 171 (2008); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on 
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999); C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, 
Earning Exclusivity:  Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947 
(2011). 
 60. See 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:2 (2007). 
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compete with the branded drug company faced significant costs and delays, giving 
the branded drug companies time beyond the expiration of the patent to sail freely in 
the market.61  The problem arises through the interaction of the drug approval system 
with the patent system.  Gaining FDA approval is a lengthy and complex process.  
Given that the patent system grants the right to exclude from making, as well as using 
and selling the drug, a would-be generic could not go through the steps to prepare 
for market entry without infringing the patent.62  Thus, competitors could never be 
ready to enter the market at the end of the patent term, and the branded company 
would enjoy continued market freedom. 
A more serious problem revolves around the extensive cost of the clinical trials 
necessary to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a medication.  The original brand-
name company could recoup the costs of these trials through higher drug prices 
during the patent period.  Once multiple generic drugs entered the market, however, 
the price would drop to the marginal cost of production.63  Thus, generic companies 
would have no incentive to enter into costly trials, given that there would be no 
opportunity to recoup those costs, and few generics would be willing to enter the 
market.64  Once again, this would leave the price of the drugs elevated beyond the 
expiration of the patent. 
Hatch-Waxman aimed to resolve these problems by providing a pathway so that 
generic hopefuls would be prepared to enter the market quickly at the expiration of 
the patent.  Among other provisions, the Act provided an abbreviated pathway so 
that companies applying for approval as a generic drug could rely on the safety and 
efficacy data created by the brand-name drug company.65  Under this Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (“ANDA”), the generic companies need only demonstrate 
that its drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug.66  
The architects of Hatch-Waxman were concerned about an additional barrier to 
getting lower-priced drugs to consumers as quickly as possible:  the existence of 
invalid patents.67  Thus, the Hatch-Waxman pathway included an incentive for 
generic hopefuls to challenge invalid patents and to engage in the necessary battles 
to overturn those patents.68  Specifically, Hatch-Waxman provides that the first 
generic to challenge a patent as invalid or not properly applying to the drug will be 
entitled to a six-month period in which no other generic company can enter the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 61. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 59, at Summary; Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 
733 F.2d 858, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The [brand-name companies] gain for themselves, it is asserted, 
a de facto monopoly of upwards of 2 years by enjoining FDA-required testing of a generic drug until the 
patent on the drug’s active ingredient expires.”). 
 62. See FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 159.  
 63. See id. (citing studies showing that the price of a drug drops 20-30% when the first generic 
enters the market and may drop over 50% when additional generics enter).  
 64. See Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or Survival 
of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 249 (2002). 
 65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).  
 66. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(v) (2012).  
 67. See 149 CONG. REC. at 16104 (2003) (Senator Hatch noting that the intention behind the 180-
day marketing exclusivity was to encourage vigorous challenges of patents held by drug firms).  
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).  
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
2016] REGULATORY PROPERTY:  THE NEW IP 69	  
market.69  Thus, during the six months, only the original branded company and the 
first generic filer can sell in the market.  This benefit is available as long as the 
generic challenger does not lose its patent challenge in court and does not forfeit its 
right to the benefit by failing to meet certain regulatory requirements.70  
a.  Six-Month Marketing Right for Generics 
Through these pathways, Hatch-Waxman created the first pieces of Regulatory 
Intellectual Property.  The six-month exclusivity is a marketing right that prevents 
competitors from entering the market during this period of time, much the same way 
that a patent prevents competitors from making, using, or selling the patented 
invention for twenty years.71  Despite its brevity, estimates suggest that the six-month 
generic benefit is enormously valuable.72 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a masterpiece of legislative compromise.  As one 
can imagine, pharmaceutical companies were not anxious to help generic companies 
quickly climb the onramp of competition.73  Thus, the Act offered various balms to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 69. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  This is commonly known as filing a “Paragraph IV certification.”  See 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 40, at 507-08.   
 70. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)-(ii) (2012).  Amendments to Hatch-Waxman in the 2003 Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act set forth six instances in which the generic 
challenger may forfeit its 180-day exclusivity period, without losing a patent infringement case:  (1) 
Failure to market the drug by the later of, one, the earlier of 75 days after the generic was approved or 30 
months after the generic submitted its application, and two, 75 days after the challenged patents have been 
deemed invalid or not infringed, (2) Withdrawal of the application, (3) Amendment or withdrawal of 
certification for patents which qualified the applicant for the 180-day exclusivity period, (4) Failure to 
obtain tentative approval within 30 months of filing, (5) Determination by the Federal Trade Commission 
or a court that an agreement between the first applicant and another applicant, the holder of the listed drug, 
or a patent owner, has violated antitrust laws, (6) Expiration of all patents to which the applicant submitted 
a certification qualifying it for the 180-day exclusivity period. The FDA interprets these six forfeit 
provisions broadly. 
 71. See text accompanying notes 25-31 (comparing and contrasting patents and marketing rights). 
 72. See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent 
Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 178, nn.55–56 (2008) (citing 
Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic to Ding Generics, WALL ST. J. B1 (Jan. 27, 2004) (“In 2002, 
when Barr successfully challenged the patent protection on Eli Lilly & Co.’s big antidepressant Prozac, 
Barr got revenue of about $368 million from the new drug, or 31% of its total for the year.”); Daniel F. 
Coughlin & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing from a Generic Manufacturer Perspective, 
25 BIOTECH L. REP. 525, 525-26 (2006) (“In general, most generic companies estimate that 60% to 80% 
of their potential profit for any one product is made during this exclusivity period.”)). 
 73. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Greene, A Prescription for Change:  How the Medicare Act Revises 
Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 315 (“[T]he brand-name drug companies 
opposed provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that expedited generic entry, arguing that strengthening the 
generic drug industry would weaken incentive for innovation.”); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th  Cong. 105-107 
(1984) (hereinafter “Hatch-Waxman Hearing”) (testimony of Verne Willamen, Member, Exec. Comm., 
Johnson & Johnson, accompanied by John R. Stafford, Pres., Am. Home Prods., and Irwin Lerner, 
Pres./CEO, Hoffman-Laroche, Inc.) (expressing opposition to Hatch-Waxman on basis that accelerating 
approval process for generics will discourage innovative activity by pharmaceutical companies); Hatch-
Waxman Hearing (statement of William E. Schuyler, Jr., former Comm. of Patents) (speaking on behalf 
of coalition of pharmaceutical companies, arguing that the bill is weighted too heavily in favor of generic 
companies); Innovation and Patent Law Reform:  Hearings before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and Admin. of Justice of the H. Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong. 423-426 (1984) (testimony of 
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sooth the pain of generic competition.  The first benefit does not create any new 
intellectual property and is indicated in the formal name of the Act—Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.74  Specifically, the Act provides that 
a patent’s term may be extended for up to five years to compensate for certain defined 
delays at regulatory agencies.75 
In addition, Hatch-Waxman’s generic pathway created another form of 
Regulatory Property.  Recall that generic hopefuls would now be able to use or 
reference in their applications the safety and efficacy data developed by the brand-
name drug company.  Hatch-Waxman provided, however, that generic companies 
could not use this data for periods of time in the following two circumstances:  data 
rights for new chemical entities and data rights for new clinical studies.  
b.  Five-Year (or Four-Year) Data Right for New Chemical Entities  
Under Hatch-Waxman, generic hopefuls may not use clinical data from the 
branded drug company for five years, if the branded drug is designated as a new 
chemical entity.76  A new chemical entity is defined under the Act as “a drug that 
contains no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA.”77  
The five-year data right is shortened to a four-year data right if a generic hopeful 
files for FDA approval certifying its intent to challenge the patent on the drug as 
invalid, not enforceable, or not infringed.78  This data right ensures a period of time 
in which the brand-name drug company will be protected from competition, 
regardless of whether the patent is invalid.  Even if the generic succeeds in 
overturning the patent before the end of the data rights, the data rights would still 
hold. 
Rather than referencing the brand-name company’s safety and efficacy data, a 
generic hopeful could choose to conduct its own clinical trials and submit the data to 
obtain FDA approval.  As described above, however, the generic company most 
likely would be unable to recoup the cost of the clinical trial with higher prices, 
making this pathway unacceptable.79  The existence of the branded drug would be 
considered prior art under the patent system, eliminating the potential for patent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
John R. Stafford, Pres., Am. Home Prods. et al.) (arguing that the legislation would encourage attacks on 
valid patents and allow generic companies to unconstitutionally take property from patent owners); 
Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting Gait: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 102-105 (1996) (statement of John Klein, Chairman of the Generic Pharm. Indus. Ass’n). 	  
 74. See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 59. 
 75. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A).  Although the patent can be extended by a maximum of five 
years, the maximum term remaining after approval cannot exceed fourteen years.  See id. § 156(c)(3).	  	  
 76. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2016).   
 77. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a); see also Dolin, supra note 51, at 1451.  See Hoffmeister et. al., 
supra note 54 (discussing court and regulatory interpretations of the statute that provide new chemical 
entity status for (1) isolated components of a previously approved mixture or (2) a drug that is a 
combination of previously approved mixtures and at least one new active ingredient). 
 78. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(3); see also Lal, supra note 47, at 3 (describing New Chemical 
Entity Exclusivity); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing Paragraph IV 
certifications). 
 79. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.  
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protection.  Similarly, the branded drug would constitute an active moiety approved 
by the FDA, eliminating the potential for five years of data protections for a new 
chemical entity.  In short, newcomers rarely will have an incentive to enter the market 
under the current system, until the data rights have expired. 
One should also note that the four or five-year data rights for new chemical entities 
are actually longer in practice.  Given that one cannot use the branded company’s 
data for a period of time, the FDA will not begin considering an application until the 
rights have expired.  FDA approval would then take one to two years beyond that 
time, at least.  Thus, the five-year data right, for example, is likely to keep 
competitors out of the market for seven years.80 
Ironically, this is the type of delay that Hatch-Waxman tried to eliminate by 
creating ready-to-market pathways so that generics could enter as soon as the patents 
expire.  Here, competition is still likely to be delayed, even when the data rights end. 
As described above, this type of Regulatory Property looks much like trade secret 
protection, in that a competitor cannot use a company’s clinical trial data but could 
develop the information on its own.81  The notion that regulatory data should be 
considered secret and proprietary to the company that created it is a relatively new 
legal concept.  The concept emerged in the early 1980s with the creation of data 
protection for pharmaceuticals, and the creation of data protection for pesticides in a 
different piece of legislation.82  Scholars have differed on the question of whether 
information necessary to gain approval from a public agency should ever be 
considered a proprietary secret.83  On the flip side, industry representatives have 
raised the question of whether an unconstitutional taking occurs if the FDA uses the 
data to approve a third party’s drug without paying just compensation to the company 
that generated the drug.84 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 80. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 5 (explaining the delay and noting that the real world impact of 
the new chemical entity exclusivity is seven years). 
 81. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136, et. seq; 
Reichman, supra note 12, at 12 n.45 (noting that concerns over preserving confidentiality of regulatory 
data have surfaced only in the last twenty-five years); see generally TREVOR M. COOK, SPECIAL REPORT:  
THE PROTECTION OF REGULATORY DATA IN PHARMACEUTICAL & OTHER SECTORS (2000). 
 83. Compare Reichman, supra note 12, at 9 (arguing that there is a basic conceptual flaw in treating 
clinical trials as a private rather than a public good) with Lietzan, supra note 50, at 95 (2016) (arguing that 
data exclusivity should be understood not as a government grant but as a period of time when all 
competitors face the same barriers to entry).  
 84. See, e.g., Letter from Bruce N. Kuhlik, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, PhRMA, 
& Caroline J. Loew, Vice President of Scientific and Regulatory Affairs, PhRMA, to FDA Division of 
Dockets Management (Nov. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04p0171/04p-0171-c000006-vol1.pdf (arguing in support of 
Genentech’s citizen petition asking that the FDA refrain from approving a biologic product that such 
approval, based on trade secret and confidential commercial information, would represent an 
unconstitutional taking); Letter from Kathleen M. Sanzo, Counsel for Pfizer Inc. and Pharmacia 
Corporation, to FDA Dockets Management Branch (July 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/06p0450/06p-0450-cp00001-04-Appendix-A-03-vol1.pdf 
(asserting that use of an innovator’s safety and effectiveness data to approve a § 505(b)(2) application 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment); John C. Yoo, Takings Issues 
in the Approval of Generic Biologics, 60 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 33 (2005) (citing brand companies who 
claim that reliance on proprietary data in approving generic applications could constitute an 
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c.  Three-year Data Right for New Clinical Studies 
Hatch-Waxman created an additional set of data rights aimed at new clinical 
studies—not to be confused with new chemical entities—that support new approvals 
of existing drugs.  These data rights are available for improvements on existing 
drugs; for example, new dosages or new indications of an existing drug that is 
marketed and approved.85  They have also been granted for new studies related to 
switching from prescription to over-the-counter for an existing drug.86 
Data rights for new clinical studies used to support changes to existing drugs last 
for three years.  Unlike its sister regime for new chemical entities, the FDA can 
accept a generic application during the three years and begin considering the 
approval, but it cannot grant approval until the three-year period of the data rights 
has expired.87 
As is generally true with various Regulatory Property and other types of 
intellectual property rights, data rights for new clinical studies can be added to other 
data rights.  Thus, for example, a company could receive a five-year data rights 
period for a new chemical entity.  Later in the life of the drug, the company could 
engage in new clinical studies, obtain a pediatric approval, and extend those data 
rights for an additional six months.88  
d.  The Hatch-Waxman Data Rights in General 
The remarkable complexity of these provisions is a testament to the legislative 
compromises embodied in the outcome.  That complexity may also have affected the 
ability of scholars and commentators to visualize these rights as intellectual property 
rights.  A twenty-year patent right is far easier to wrap one’s head around than the 
complex, three-year or five-year (unless it is four-year) structure of the data rights in 
Hatch-Waxman. 
It is certainly true that the data rights legislation packs an enormous amount of 
complexity into its provisions.  Nevertheless, other forms of intellectual property are 
not the models of elegant simplicity one might imagine.  The term of Copyright 
certainly is not sleek at “life of the author plus 70 years” unless it is a corporate 
author, in which case the term is “95 years from first publication or 120 years from 
creation, whichever comes first.”89  And, as described above, patents may be 
extended to reflect regulatory delays.  No form of intellectual property can claim to 
be free of internal complexity, even as to term length.90  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unconstitutional taking of private property).  
 85. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(5)(ii); see also Thomas, supra note 32, at 6. 
 86. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 6. 
 87. See id. at 7. 
 88. See id.; Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid:  Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2008); see also Reichman, supra note 12, at 13.  
 89. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), (c).  
 90. One scholar suggests that Hatch-Waxman Regulatory Property can be distinguished from other 
forms of Regulatory Property in an important manner.  The various rights Congress provided to 
pharmaceutical companies in Hatch-Waxman can be understood to some extent as “compensatory,” in 
that they provide some recompense for the time that regulators “take” in the clinical trial process.  In 
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2.  Orphan Drugs 
Ah, the plight of orphans.  Of all the brilliant strategic choices ever made, naming 
this regulatory scheme “The Orphan Drug Act” surely ranks among the most 
inspired.  After all, who could oppose medical treatment for orphans—particularly 
not when Congressional testimony includes Hollywood stars re-enacting heart-
wrenching dramatizations? 
The history of the Act and its legacy are more complex than the name might imply, 
however.  The program was intended to provide incentives for the development of 
drugs to treat diseases that affect only small numbers of patients, on the theory that 
when the customer base is limited, the potential returns are too low to stimulate drug 
research and development.  The program has spread like wildfire, however, to the 
point at which orphan drugs accounted for more than 40 percent of drugs approved 
by the FDA in 2015.91  As one scholar has noted, what do we do, “[w]hen everyone 
is an orphan?”92 
Timing of the Orphan Drug Act differs slightly from that of the other types of 
Regulatory Property described above.  The 97th Congress passed the original Orphan 
Drug Act, while the Hatch-Waxman Act did not pass until the 98th Congress.93  Thus, 
both Acts were under consideration during the same time, although they passed in 
separate Congresses.94  
The timing of the two initiatives matches precisely, however, when one looks at 
the key amendment to the Orphan Drug Act.  The original Orphan Drug Act was not 
a rousing success, and commentators have suggested that pharmaceutical companies 
were reluctant to submit applications under the definitions in the Act as passed.95  In 
response, the same Congress that passed the Hatch-Waxman Act also amended the 
key definition in the Orphan Drug Act, and the orphan drug program took off from 
there.96  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contrast, provisions such as the Orphan Drug Act explicitly provide additional incentives.  See 
Correspondence from Heidi Williams (Sept. 28, 2016) (on file with author).  
 91. See Daniel et. al., supra note 2, at 1; see also OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58.  
 92. The quoted phrase is the title of an article by Matthew Herder.  See Matthew Herder, When 
Everyone Is an Orphan:  Against Adopting a U.S.-Styled Orphan Drug Policy in Canada, 20 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES.  227, 227 (2013). 
 93. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 97 H.R. 5238, 97th Cong. (1983); Hatch-Waxman 
Act, supra note 59.  
 94. See DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS:  A GUIDE TO 
FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS app. 34-3 (8th ed. 2016) (noting that in the 97th Congress, the Senate 
unanimously passed a patent term restoration bill, but the House of Representatives narrowly failed to 
approve); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug 
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 188 (describing the failure of Patent Term Restoration 
Act in the 97th Congress and its transformation into a patent term restoration and drug price competition 
bill in the 98th Congress); Albert Gore, Jr., Patent Term Extension:  An Expensive and Unnecessary 
Giveaway, 1 HEALTH AFF. 25, 26 (1982) (discussing legislation introduced in the 97th Congress which 
would extend patent term for pharmaceuticals). 
 95. See Loughnot, supra note 56, at 375; see also Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s 
Right With It, 15 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 307 (noting that the response to the 1983 Orphan 
Drug Act was “underwhelming”). 
 96. See Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 
Stat. 2815 (1984) (passed on Oct. 11, 1984, with amendment to orphan drug definition); Hatch-Waxman 
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There have been other amendments to the Orphan Drug Act across time, however, 
but these have not had the same impact as the amendment passed at the same time as 
Hatch-Waxman.97  For example, Congress approved an amendment to the Act in 
1985 to include patentable as well as unpatentable drugs in the program and in 1988 
requiring sponsors to apply for orphan designation before applying for drug approval.  
A graph of designations and approvals of Orphan Drugs from the Department of 
Health and Human Services, however, shows no significant jump in approvals in the 
year following either amendment.98  In short, the key moment in the history of the 
Orphan Drug Act program took place in the same Congress as passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, and the Act should be understood as part of the benefits granted to the 
branded pharmaceutical industry at this time. 
a.  Logic and Structure of the Orphan Drug Act 
As described above, the Orphan Drug Act was intended to stimulate investment 
in the creation and production of drugs that treat diseases that affect only small 
numbers of people.  Policy makers were concerned that such small populations 
would not make a revenue base sufficient to recoup the costs, and thus, these disease 
populations would languish untreated. 
The original Orphan Drug Act defined a rare disease as one for which there was 
no “reasonable expectation that the cost of developing . . . will be recovered from 
sales in the United States.”99  The 1984 amendment, however, greatly expanded the 
definition of rare disease so that a drug now qualifies if it meets either of the 
following two definitions:  (1) diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 people in the 
United States; or (2) diseases that affect more than 200,000 people in the United 
States but for which there is no reasonable expectation that sales would recover the 
costs.100  As noted in a government report, the 200,000 threshold was an arbitrary 
number that was chosen based on the estimated prevalence of narcolepsy and 
multiple sclerosis.101 
A drug does not have to be new to qualify for orphan drug status.  If existing drugs 
are approved for an orphan indication, those drugs will receive the benefits of the 
Act as well.102  For example, thalidomide, an anti-nausea drug that fell out of favor 
in the 1960s when it was linked to birth defects, received an orphan drug designation 
in 1998 for the treatment of leprosy and in 2006 for the treatment of a form of cancer 
called multiple myeloma.103  
The practice of repurposing old drugs as new orphans has made the national news 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Act, supra note 59 (passed on Sept. 12, 1984, approximately one month before passage of 1984 Orphan 
Drug Act amendments).  
 97. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 53, at 4. 
 98. See id. at 7. 
 99. See Orphan Drug Act § 526(a)(2) (1982); Thomas, supra note 32, at 7. 
 100. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1994). 
 101. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 53, at 4.  
 102. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Daniel H. Solomon, Incentives for Drug Development—The 
Curious Case of Colchicine, 362 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2045, 2046 (2010). 
 103. Id. 
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recently, and not in a flattering manner.  For example, patients with a rare 
neuromuscular disease had been using the drug, 3,4-diaminopyridine (“3,4-DAP”), 
for over thirty years; anecdotal data had shown 3,4-DAP to be safe and effective 
since 1983.104  The drug had never received FDA approval but was provided to 
patients for free through a generous company and the FDA’s “compassionate use” 
Investigational New Drug (“IND”) program.105  In 2015, another company filed an 
application for orphan drug approval of a modified version of the drug that does not 
need refrigeration.106  The press report suggests that while the drug costs $600 to 
make a year’s supply for one patient, the company plans to sell it in the range of 
$100,000 per patient each year.107 
The Act provides a variety of benefits for pharmaceutical companies who develop 
medicines to treat rare diseases, including tax breaks, priority review by the FDA, 
and various grants.108  The greatest benefit, however, is seven years of marketing 
rights.  Notwithstanding limited exceptions, these are the quasi-patent rights that will 
generally prevent the FDA from granting approval to any other company to make the 
same drug for the same orphan indication, regardless of whether the other company 
relies on its own clinical trial data.  In other words, it is the granddaddy of the rights, 
both from the perspective of the power of the right and from the perspective of how 
long it lasts.  Seven years is, by far, the longest of any of the forms of Regulatory 
Property.  Thus, it is not surprising that the program has attracted considerable 
interest from pharmaceutical companies. 
Wonderful drugs have been approved through the Orphan Drug Act portal.109  
These have included treatments for a rare genetic disorder called Gaucher’s disease, 
a truly rare form of the already rare Ebola virus, and many others.110  Some would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 104. See Ted M. Burns et al., Editorial by Concerned Physicians:  Unintended Effect of the Orphan 
Drug Act on the Potential Cost of 3,4-Diaminopyridine, 53 MUSCLE NERVE 165, 166-67 (2016).  
 105. Id.  The “compassionate use” IND program gives patients with serious or life-threatening 
diseases access to drugs that are still undergoing clinical trials, if there are no comparable or satisfactory 
therapeutic alternatives available.  See Alexander Gaffney, Regulatory Explainer:  FDA’s Expanded 
Access (Compassionate Use) Program, REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Feb. 4, 2015), available at 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/02/04/18343/Regulatory-Explainer-FDAs-Expanded-
Access-Compassionate-Use-Program/. 
 106. See Sabrina Tavernise, Patients Fear Spike in Price of Old Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/health/patients-fear-spike-in-price-of-old-drugs.html. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982); Thomas, supra note 32, at 8.  
Orphan drug companies are eligible for up to $500,000 a year for up to four years, a tax credit of 50% of 
qualifying clinical trial costs, a waiver of application fees worth more than $2 million, and what I would 
call “concierge service at the FDA,” that is, assistance from the FDA on what tests and trials the drug 
company needs to complete to secure marketing approval.  See Daniel et. al., supra note 2, at 210; 
Pulsinelli, supra note 95, at 6.  For example, in the drug approval process ordinarily, the FDA maintains 
a distant, objective, and some would say antagonistic, relationship with the applicant, while during orphan 
drug approval process, the FDA establishes a more collegial relationship, working with the company to 
get the trials accomplished and move the drug to market expeditiously.  See Loughnot, supra note 56, at 
368. 
 109. See Thomas Maeder, The Orphan Drug Backlash, 288 SCI. AM. 80, 87 (2003) (quoting Abbey 
S. Meyers, President of the National Organization for Rare Disorders, as saying “[t]he Orphan Drug Act 
works fabulously well. . . . We have treatments we never imagined we would”). 
 110. See Daniel et. al., supra note 2, at 210. 
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say, however, that the program has been too successful.  In fact, orphan drugs seem 
to be dominating the modern medical system.  For example, in 2015, more than 40 
percent of all FDA-approved drugs on the market were submitted as orphan drugs,111 
and over 41 percent of the new drugs approved by the FDA in 2014 were for drugs 
that had an orphan indication.112  Moreover, of the drugs forecast to be the top ten 
best-selling drugs in 2015, seven were drugs with some form of orphan indication.113 
The same is true for drugs that are regulated by the FDA as biologics.114  In 2001, 
five of the ten best-selling biologic drugs were originally approved as orphan drugs 
and three more were approved for orphan indications in addition to their original 
use.115  In other words, 80 percent of the best-selling biologics were related to the 
Orphan Drug Act in some manner—and that was only in 2001. 
It is not surprising that so many of the best-selling biologic drugs have orphan 
designations.  Modern biologics tend to be targeted at specific patient populations, 
making the area ripe for universal orphan designation.  In fact, some scholars have 
bemoaned the fact that the Orphan Drug Act is driving medical science 
overwhelmingly towards cancer therapeutics.116  Cancer therapeutics focus on 
precision medicine techniques and small, particularized populations that are defined 
by DNA diagnostic testing, for which orphan drug designations are a natural fit.  As 
one commentator noted, “all cancers but four are considered to be rare diseases.”117  
Although cancer is certainly an important health concern, one could question whether 
so much of societal energy should be directed at cancer, and whether Congress 
intended this result. 
The dominance of orphan drugs also can be seen in the value of total sales.  For 
example, one group projects that between 2014 and 2020, orphan drug sales will 
increase at twice the rate of overall prescription drug sales worldwide, with orphan 
drug sales reaching $176 billion in 2020.118  Following those projections, orphan 
drug sales will constitute almost 20 percent of worldwide prescription drug sales as 
a whole by 2020. 
Finally, the price of orphan drugs is shockingly high.  The median cost per patient 
to use an orphan drug for one year is almost $99,000.119  In comparison, for non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 111. See sources cited at note 54, supra.  
 112. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., NOVEL NEW 
DRUGS 2014 SUMMARY 5 (Jan. 2015),  
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/UCM430299.pdf, 
(explaining that over 41% of the novel drugs approved in 2014—17 of 41—were approved to treat orphan 
diseases). 
 113. See Daniel et. al, supra note 2, at 211.  
 114. For an explanation of the difference between chemical (also known as small molecule) drugs 
and biologic drugs, see text accompanying notes 134-144 infra. 
 115. See Maeder, supra note 109, at 84. 
 116. See Herder, supra note 92, at 247-49; see also Olivier Wellman-Labadie & Youwen Zhou, 
The US Orphan Drug Act:  Rare Disease Research Stimulator or Commercial Opportunity?,  95  
HEALTH  POL’Y  216, 225 (2010) (discussing the trend and its implications). 
 117. See Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 116, at 225 (citing Abbey S. Meyers, Executive 
Director of the National Organization for Rare Disorders). 
 118. Andreas Hadjivasilou, EVALUATEPHARMA, ORPHAN DRUG REPORT 2014, at 4 (Oct. 2014), 
available at http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/evaluatepharmaltd/images/2014OD.pdf.  
 119. Daniel et. al., supra note 2, at 2 (citing Hadjivasilou, supra note 118, at 8). 
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orphan drugs, the cost is roughly $5,000.120  In addition, the price tag for the most 
expensive orphan drugs soars well above the median.  The poster child is Genzyme’s 
drug Cerezyme, which is an enzyme replacement therapy for treating the genetic 
disorder known as Gaucher’s disease.  The company reportedly charged between 
$100,000 and $400,000 a year per patient, depending on whether the patient was a 
child or an adult, earning close to half a billion dollars a year.121 
To some extent, high prices for orphan drugs may be perfectly understandable.  If 
a company must recoup its investment over a small group of customers, the cost per 
customer is bound to be high.  After all, one could argue that an expensive treatment 
is better than no treatment at all.  The problem is that in many cases, those high prices 
seem to be spread across much larger populations than the Act anticipates.  In other 
words, critics note that companies earn the right to charge mega-prices by claiming 
to serve small populations, and then use various techniques to charge those mega-
prices across broader populations.122  One could call these techniques “spillover 
pricing.” 
Spillover pricing can occur in a variety of ways.  The simplest is through off-label 
use.  Off-label use occurs when doctors prescribe a medicine to treat something that 
is not one of the indications approved by the FDA.123  It is a common practice in 
medicine.  In fact, the Second Circuit recently ruled that given the First Amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 120. Id. 
 121. See Maeder, supra note 109, at 85-86.  Genzyme was acquired by the French pharmaceutical 
company Sanofi in 2011.  See Jeanne Whalen & Mimosa Spencer, Sanofi Wins Long-Sought Biotech Deal, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2011) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703373404576147483489656732.  In 2014, worldwide 
sales of Cerezyme reached nearly one billion dollars.  See EVALUATE, CEREZYME (2016), 
https://www.evaluategroup.com/View/15461--1002-modData/product/cerezyme; Carolyn Y. Johnson, 
High Prices Make Once-Neglected Drugs a Booming Business, WASH. POST, (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/high-prices-make-once-neglected-orphan-drugs-a-
booming-business/2016/08/04/539d0968-1e10-11e6-9c81-4be1c14fb8c8_story.html. 
 122. See, e.g., Daniel et al., supra note 2; Maeder, supra note 109, at 85; Brian B. Eller, Promoting 
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry by Expanding the FDA’s Regulatory Powers to Grant Market 
Exclusivity, (Dec. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1790566), text accompanying note 106;	  Loughnot, 
supra note 56, at 366; Herder, supra note 92, at 247; Pulsinelli, supra note 95, at 315-16.  For similar 
observations related to orphan drug pricing in other countries, see Panos Kanavos & Elana Nicod, What 
is Wrong With Orphan Drug Policies:  Suggestions for Ways Forward, 15 VALUE IN HEALTH 1182, text 
accompanying note 19 (2012); Alain Denis, et al., Issues Surrounding Orphan Disease and Orphan Drug 
Policies in Europe, 8 APP. HEALTH ECON. HEALTH POL. 343 (2010); Eline Picavet, Thomas Morel, David 
Cassiman & Steven Simoens, Shining a Light in the Black Box of Orphan Drug Pricing, 9 ORPHANET J. 
OF RARE DISEASES 62 (2014).   
 123. Most commonly, “off-label use” refers to the prescription of a currently available medication 
for an indication (disease or symptom) that has not received FDA approval.  It can, however, also refer to 
the use of a medication in a patient population, dosage, or dosage form that has not received FDA approval.  
See Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) About Off-label Drug Use, 
87 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 982, 982 (2012).  The practice of off-label use is common, with rates of up to 40% 
in adults and up to 90% in some hospitalized pediatric populations.  See Madlen Gazarian et al., Off-Label 
Use of Medicines: Consensus Recommendations for Evaluating Appropriateness, 185 MED. J. AUST. 544, 
544 (2006).  Off-label prescriptions are legal, and can allow for life-saving innovation in clinical practice.  
See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 N. ENGL. 
J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).  
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protections for freedom of speech, the FDA cannot prevent a drug company from 
promoting a drug for off-label uses, as long as the message is truthful and not 
misleading.124  
Off-label uses can be a great boon for orphan drug makers.  A company can seek 
approval from the FDA to use their drug for treatment of a small population—small 
enough to fit within the Orphan Drug Act’s definition of fewer than 200,000 people 
in the United States.  After approval, the company may be able to expand the patient 
population well beyond the 200,000 through additional off-label uses.125  
For example, the Lidoderm patch was originally approved for a painful 
complication of shingles that affects nerve fibers.126  One study found, however, that 
the company earned more than 80% of its revenue from uses other than the original 
orphan drug indication, when examining Medicare spending in two states.127  
Perhaps the classic case of off-label expansion of an orphan drug can be seen with 
Epogen.  The FDA originally approved Epogen with an orphan designation for the 
treatment of anemia related to end-stage renal disease.128  After approval, the drug 
became widely prescribed for treating a variety of forms of anemia—some approved 
uses and some off-label, generating billions of dollars of revenue for the company.129 
At first glance, one might wonder why in the world this strategy would work.  
After all, under the Orphan Drug Act, the FDA grants seven years of marketing 
exclusivity, but only for the particular orphan indication.130  In other words, if there 
is no orphan drug exclusivity for those off-label uses, why wouldn’t another 
company jump in to compete for the off-label use?  
In order to get off-label use of one’s drug however, one has to get onto the market 
in the first place.  A competitor could not get onto the market for the same orphan 
indication, which is blocked by seven years of orphan exclusivity.  The competitor 
could try to get approval for the drug directly for the off-label use, but that would 
require much time and extensive clinical trials.  Those clinical trials, of course, would 
not have the many advantages of orphan drug clinical trials, including priority review 
at the FDA, financial grants, and tax breaks.  Thus, in reality, one can obtain the 
benefits of orphan drug status while garnering spillover returns from a much larger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 124. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 125. Though a physician can prescribe an orphan drug for off-label uses, orphan drug status does 
not preclude approval of the same drug for another disease or condition.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 726-27 (2013) (citing Sigma-Tau 
Pharm v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2002)).  
 126. See Daniel et al., supra note 2, at 212 (describing Lidoderm’s initial approval for 
hypersensitivity in postherpetic neuralgia).  For an explanation of postherpetic neuralgia, see Mayo Clinic 
Staff, Postherpetic Neuralgia, MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 16, 2015), available at 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/postherpetic-neuralgia/basics/definition/con-20023743. 
 127. See Daniel et al., supra note 2, at 3 (citing Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The Prevalence and 
Cost of Unapproved Uses of Top-Selling Orphan Drugs, PLOS ONE (Feb. 21, 2012), available at  
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0031894. 
 128. See Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan Drug Incentives in the 
Pharmacogenomic Context:  Policy Responses to the US and Canada, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 5 (2015), 
text accompanying notes 37-38, available at 
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/05/18/jlb.lsv013.full.  
 129. See id. 
 130. See Lal, supra note 47, at 2. 
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off-label population. 
In addition to off-label uses, companies can garner spillover returns by applying 
for separate orphan designations for different uses of the same drug.  Once again, 
this presses against the original purpose of the Orphan Drug Act.  For example, the 
FDA originally approved the drug Imatinib with an orphan designation for treating a 
rare form of leukemia that affects only 9,000 patients.131  The company subsequently 
received six additional orphan designations for treating other forms of cancer, a 
syndrome related to an autoimmune disease, and certain bone marrow disorders.132   
If a single drug can be used for multiple patient populations, those populations 
added together should provide enough of a return to tempt the company to make the 
drug.  The return certainly is reduced by the need to engage in separate clinical trials 
for different uses.  Nevertheless, the costs of production and development of a stable, 
usable compound are spread across a much larger population than what Congress 
contemplated with its “orphan” designation. 
A more extreme form of finding additional designations for a single orphan drug 
is known as “salami slicing.”133  With salami slicing, a company divides the treatment 
population into small slices and obtains different orphan designations for each slice.  
Divisions have been based, for example, on whether a particular disease is early stage 
or end stage, different manifestations of a disease, or different mutations leading to 
the same genetic disease.  The risk is that companies could divide populations into 
ever-finer slices until, in theory, reaching the absurd point of testing headaches in 
males who just bumped their head on the car door in the last two weeks. 
In 2013, the FDA issued guidelines intended to reduce salami slicing behaviors.134  
The new guidelines are enormously complex, however, and the jury is still out on 
whether the guidelines will be successful.135 
The policy implications of behaviors such as off-label uses, additional orphan 
designations, and salami slicing are unclear.  On the one hand, one could argue that 
society should encourage drug makers to look for all possible uses for the medicines 
we already have.  Society should exploit to the fullest those substances for which we 
have the greatest experience and knowledge, before we go chasing after new 
rainbows.  On the other hand, a policy that encourages constant repurposing of what 
researchers already know risks ossifying scientific advancement.  
Putting aside the policy implications, however, the economic implications are 
quite troubling.  Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act for the purpose of creating 
incentives when patient populations were too small for drug companies to serve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 131. See Daniel et al., supra note 2, at 212. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Gibson & von Tigerstrom, supra note 128.  Some scholars use the term “salami slicing” to 
refer not only to additional approved uses but also to off-label uses of the same drug.  See id., text 
accompanying notes 36-38 (describing the off-label uses of Epogen as a form of salami slicing). 
 134. See Orphan Drug Regulations (Final Rule), 78 Fed. Reg. 35117, 35120–21 (June 12, 2013) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316)	  (clarifying and providing guidance on the circumstances under which a 
subset of a common disease would qualify for an orphan designation). 
 135. See Gibson & von Tigerstrom, supra note 128, and text accompanying notes 46-86 (describing 
the new guidelines and discussing uncertainty about the impact they will have); Daniel et al., supra note 
2 at 212 (noting that the success of the 2013 wording change remains to be determined).  
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them.  When drug companies aggregate multiple populations, it defeats the purpose 
of the Act. 
The saga of the Orphan Drug Act is tantalizingly reminiscent of the Gilbert & 
Sullivan operetta, Pirates of Penzance.  The pirates in the play have declared that 
they will never harm an orphan, and express frustration that “[e]veryone we capture 
says he’s an orphan. The last three ships we took proved to be manned entirely by 
orphans, and so, we had to let them go.”136  
What should society do as more and more companies show up at the FDA, 
claiming to serve orphans?  At least with Gilbert & Sullivan, the characters are unable 
to make any money from orphans.  Here, however, it is the reverse.  When so many 
companies claim they are only serving orphans, the orphans—that is, the patients—
may be the ones having their finances ravaged.    
The Orphan Drug Act is the last of the pieces of Regulatory Property created at 
the time of passage of the Hatch-Waxman system in exchange for expedited approval 
of generic drugs.  As described above, these forms of Regulatory Property include 
ones for first generic filers, new chemical entities, new clinical studies, and orphan 
drugs.  
B.  REGULATORY PROPERTY WITH THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The next major group of Regulatory Property benefits were granted during the 
Congress that passed the health care legislation known as the Affordable Care Act.  
As part of the Affordable Care Act, the 111th Congress also approved major 
legislation to create a pathway for accelerated approval of biologic drugs, known as 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“Biologics Act”).137  
Unsurprisingly, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries both vigorously 
opposed the Biologics Act.138  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 136. W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE; OR, THE SLAVE OF DUTY: 
COMIC OPERA IN TWO ACTS 6 (1880). 
 137. For an explanation of biologic drugs, see supra text accompanying notes 134-144. 
 138. See ROBERT WEISSMAN ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, COMPETITION INHIBITORS:  HOW BIOLOGICS 
MAKERS ARE LEVERAGING POLITICAL POWER TO MAINTAIN MONOPOLIES AND KEEP PRICES SKY-HIGH 
6 (2014), https://perma.cc/YXK2-KA76.	   	   Initially, industry associations such as BIO (Biotechnology 
Industry Organization) and PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America) argued 
that there should be no biosimilars pathway at all, claiming that it was impossible to make safe and 
effective copies of biologics.  See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 708 (2010).  
Manufacturers such as Amgen and Genentech argued that biosimilars could not be shown to be 
“therapeutically equivalent” to the reference products, and that if biosimilars were to be approved, it would 
require a “full complement of critical animal and clinical studies.”  Letter from Kenneth Seamon, Amgen, 
Inc. to FDA, Docket No. FDA-2004-N-0059, 9-10 (2004).  When it was clear that some sort of biologics 
pathway would be incorporated into the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the industry lobbied to make sure 
the pathway would be as restrictive as possible.  Representative Anna Eshoo introduced a bill that set forth 
very stringent requirements for generic biologics, and her bill was incorporated into the enacted ACA.  
Rep. Eshoo has received more campaign contributions from the pharmaceutical industry than any other 
industry over the course of her career.  See WEISSMAN ET AL., supra at 13 (citing Rep. Anna Eshoo:  
Industry Data, OpenSecrets.org: Center for Responsive Politics), https://perma.cc/ZQN8-R2YU.  The 
pharmaceutical industry has also taken the biologics fight to the state level, proposing legislation to limit 
the ability of pharmacists to substitute generic biologics for their brand name products.  See Andrew 
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It is interesting to note that during roughly this same period in history, Congress 
was debating another major reform act with provisions opposed by the 
pharmaceutical industry.  In the year following approval of the Biologics Act, 
Congress passed the patent reform act known as the America Invents Act.  Approved 
in 2011, the America Invents Act included numerous changes to patent law, 
including creating a series of methods for third parties to challenge the validity of a 
patent at the Patent and Trademark Office after the patent has been granted.  The 
pharmaceutical industry was deeply opposed to patent reform in general, and certain 
earlier iterations of the legislative proposal.  The industry reluctantly supported the 
2011 America Invents Act, however, because it was gutted of some of the most 
objectionable provisions, and because they were concerned that future iterations 
would be even less favorable to their interests.139  Although the patent reform act did 
not pass until the 112th Congress, that legislation was discussed and debated during 
the prior Congress as well, which passed the fateful Affordable Care Act with its 
biosimilar provisions.  Given the historic proximity, this Article groups together the 
pieces of legislation passed in the 111th Congress and the 112th Congress as a single 
wave.  And to make the pattern even more consistent, the 112th Congress approved 
legislation to tighten limits on the ability of pharmaceutical companies to obstruct 
generic entry using the FDA Citizen Petition process. 140 
Once again, in the period in which Congress passed legislation that the 
pharmaceutical industry bitterly opposed, Congress passed legislation that created 
forms of Regulatory Property.  Thus, Congress created Regulatory Property for drugs 
for infectious diseases, biologics, and clinical trials for pediatric use of drugs.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013) at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-in-states-on-generic-copies-of-
biotech-drugs.html. 
 139. Specifically, the pharmaceutical industry opposed a series of patent reform bills proposed 
between 2005 and 2011, including the 2009 Patent Reform Act.  In 2011, however, Senator Patrick Leahy 
introduced an amended version that removed the provisions that the pharmaceutical companies found 
most objectionable.  See Susanne Hollinger, The America Invents Act Implementation, 23 EXPERT 
OPINION THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 545 (2013);  PhRMA Statement on Patent Reform Act of 2009, PHRMA 
(Mar. 3, 2009), https://perma.cc/ZA4V-E4DF (expressing concern over more lenient penalties for patent 
infringers in the Act).  Upon introduction of the Senate bill for the America Invents Act, it was widely 
believed that any further iteration of the bill would be even less favorable to the pharmaceutical industry; 
so many companies who were previously opposed to patent reform chose to support it.  See Manus 
Cooney, The America Invents Act – How It All Went Down, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/20/the-america-invents-act-how-it-all-went-down/id=19294/; 
PhRMA Statement on Patent Reform – 2011, PHRMA (June 23, 2011), https://perma.cc/Z2LL-G2AZ.  
Yet, the pharmaceutical industry began to take issue with implementation of the American Invents Act 
after its passage, lobbying for review exemptions for certain biopharmaceutical patents.  See Matthew 
Bultman, Pharma Lobby Wants Some Patents Exempt from AIA Review, LAW360 (July 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/SA5M-DWPD. 
 140. As described below in the context of tropical disease vouchers, Congress attempted to reign in 
citizen petition abuse in 2007.  See infra text accompanying note 197.  The 2012 legislation tightened the 
2007 restrictions by shortening the period of time for the FDA to respond to such petition efforts.  See 21 
U.S.C. §355(q)(1)(A); see also Robin C. Feldman, Evan Frondorf & Andrew K. Cordova, Empirical 
Evidence of Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, (forthcoming) (discussing the 
legislation and presenting an empirical analysis of its failure to stop the targeted behavior), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833151. 
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general, the pattern among this wave of Regulatory Property can best be described 
as “just add more.” 
1.  Biologics 
The 111th Congress embarked on a process reminiscent of the Hatch-Waxman 
legislation for expedited approval of generic drugs.  The Hatch-Waxman pathway 
only covers what is known as chemical drugs.  The decades since introduction of the 
Hatch-Waxman system have witnessed the increased development of a relatively 
new breed of medicines knows as biologics. Biologics differ from ordinary chemical 
drugs both in terms of structure and in terms of the process of production.141  
Consider first ordinary chemical drugs, such as aspirin. These are sometimes 
called small molecule drugs because their chemical structure is composed of 
relatively fewer atoms than biologics.142  A typical chemical drug is made up of 
dozens of atoms forming one molecule.143  The structure of a chemical drug is also 
relatively simple to understand and depict; one can typically draw the structure with 
a simple two-dimensional sketch. Finally, chemical drugs are far easier to make than 
biologics.144  The proper chemical ingredients are combined in the lab and react 
together to form a new chemical.  Although manufacturing any product is never quite 
so simple, the process of producing a chemical drug pales in comparison to the 
process for its cousin, the biologic. 
Biologics differ greatly from their country cousins, chemical drugs.  Rather than 
a few dozen atoms aggregating into one molecule, biologics contain thousands to 
millions of atoms formed into an intricately integrated set of perhaps thousands of 
molecules.145  These numerous molecules are folded into complex shapes that cannot 
be depicted in a simple two-dimensional drawing.146  Most importantly, biologics are 
so large and complex that scientists do not know how to build them chemically in an 
efficient manner.147  Instead, scientists use living cells, carefully nurtured in a 
laboratory setting to act as a form of living machinery to create the necessary 
substance.148  Given that biologic drugs are created through a process involving 
living cells, that process cannot be controlled with the same precision as mixing 
chemicals.149  Just as no two human beings could ever be precisely alike, it is virtually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 141. See Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Follow-On Biologics:  The Law and Intellectual 
Property Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. (2010) [hereinafter CONG. RES. SERV.: BIOLOGICS] (citing Gary C. 
Messplay & Collen Heisey, Follow-On Biologics: The Evolving Regulatory Landscape, BIOEXECUTIVE 
INT’L 43 (2006)).  
 142. See Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation Must 
Come Before Price Competition, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1 (2009). 
 143. Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 369 (2007). 
 144. See Schacht & Thomas, supra note 141, at 7.  
 145. See Liang, supra note 143, at 369. 
 146. See Sahr, supra note 142, at 2.  
 147. See id.  
 148. See id. (citing Benjamin Leader et al., Protein Therapeutics: A Summary and Pharmacological 
Classification, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 21 (2008)).   
 149. See id. (citing BIOTECH. INNOVATION ORG., How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, 
https://perma.cc/QQ4H-2XXL). 
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
2016] REGULATORY PROPERTY:  THE NEW IP 83	  
impossible to make a truly identical copy of, for example, a protein made using 
different production cell lines.150  Particularly concerning are subtle, virtually 
undetectable variations in structure or stability of the cell line that may result in a 
drug that is less effective or downright dangerous.151  Given the complexities of the 
drugs, the potential subtle differences, and the potential risks, the process for 
approval of copies of biologic drugs cannot be as streamlined as the process for 
approving generic versions of chemical drugs.  
Prompted by the high cost of biologic drugs, the 111th Congress created a 
pathway for approval of copies of brand name biologics.152  The legislation was 
called the Biologics Act and was passed as a last minute addition to massive health 
care reform law known as the Affordable Care Act.153  The pathway for approval is 
far more rigorous than what is required for approval of generic drugs, and it involves 
more extensive testing and trials.  Copies of biologic drugs are called biosimilars or 
interchangeables, rather than generics.154  Receiving a designation of “biosimilarity” 
requires that the biological product is “highly similar” to the reference product and 
“no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the 
reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product.”155  The 
designation of “interchangeable,” meanwhile, is much less easily attainable, 
requiring that the biological product not only be biosimilar, but also be able to 
“produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient” and 
exhibit no difference in risk or efficacy than the reference product.156  To date, only 
a couple of biosimilar products have been approved by the FDA, and no products 
have been approved as “interchangeable.” 
As with the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Biologics Act creates several forms of 
Regulatory Property for biologic drugs, but the Regulatory Property in the Biologics 
Act lasts longer than the Regulatory Property created in Hatch-Waxman.  The 
following paragraphs describe the two acts in comparison, to highlight the 
differences. 
As described above, the Hatch-Waxman Act created six months of marketing 
rights for the first generic filer who challenged a patent protecting the branded drug 
and three to five years of data rights for original pharmaceutical makers.157  In 
contrast to the Hatch-Waxman’s six months of marketing rights, the Biologics Act 
contains no marketing rights for the first biosimilar filer, significantly reducing the 
allure of creating a biosimilar.  For those who create interchangeables, however, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 150. See Liang, supra note 143, at 370 (citing Simon D. Roger, Biosimilars: How Similar or 
Dissimilar Are They?, 11 NEPHROLOGY 341 (2006)).  
 151. See Sahr, supra note 142, at 3.  
 152. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (2015); see also Kate S. Gaudry, Exclusivity Strategies and 
Opportunities in view of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 587, 
587-88 (2011).  
 153. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804, 
807 (2009) [hereinafter “Biologics Act”].  See Thomas, supra note 32, at 8-9. 
 154. See Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential Problems in 
the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 222 (2015). 
 155. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i)(3). 
 156. See id. at § 262(k)(4). 
 157. See supra, text accompanying notes 66-82. 
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period of marketing rights last much longer.158  There is a complicated calculus under 
the Biologics Act, depending on the state of any litigation, but the shortest period of 
time is twelve months.159 
The Regulatory Property for the original drug maker is considerably longer and 
stronger under the Biologics Act.  Specifically, the original drug maker receives 
twelve years of data rights under the Biologics Act.160  For the first four years, 161 no 
follow-on companies may apply, even if they use their own data and if patents on the 
original drug are invalidated.  For the remaining eight years, a follow-on company 
could apply and receive approval, but could not rely on any data from the original 
drug maker.  
The language of the Biologics Act itself is less than a model of clarity, and 
arguably it could be read to suggest that original biologic drug makers receive twelve 
years of marketing rights, rather than twelve years of data rights.  As described above, 
marketing rights are the stronger ones because they prevent the FDA from approving 
follow-on biologics created by any other companies, even those who use their own, 
original data.162  Following letters from members of Congress, however, the FDA 
has interpreted the twelve years in the Biologics Act to refer to only data rights.163  
In short, the Biologics Act provides a less streamlined pathway for approval of 
follow on biologic drugs, and the Regulatory Property is generally longer and 
stronger.  Commentators are skeptical of whether the Biologics Act will result in the 
same type of price reductions that consumers have enjoyed with generic drugs under 
the Hatch-Waxman regime.164  In addition to the more complex regulatory pathway, 
drug companies that make the original biologic drugs have been raising their prices 
in the years immediately prior to introduction of the biosimilar products, and the 
follow-on companies are setting their prices accordingly.165  The system is too new, 
however, and too few follow-on biologics have been approved for scholars to draw 
generalizable conclusions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 158. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6).  
 159. See Biologics Act, supra note 153.  The precise time is the earlier of one year after commercial 
marketing, eighteen months after approval if not subject to litigation, eighteen months after final court 
decision or dismissal, or forty-two months after approval if litigation is ongoing.  The varying times may 
reflect an attempt to head off the so-called pay-for-delay settlements under Hatch-Waxman.  Hatch-
Waxman has been plagued by deals in which the branded pharmaceutical company enters into a settlement 
with the would-be generic in which the generic agrees to stay off the market for a period of time in 
exchange for some form of payment.  For a description of this behavior, along with discussion of the 
judicial, regulatory, and legislative responses, see Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 40. 
 160. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A).  
 161. See id. § 262(k)(7)(B).   
 162. See supra, text accompanying notes 25-37. 
 163. For a description of the controversy and excerpts from the Congressional letters, see Thomas, 
supra note 32, at 8-9. 
 164. See, e.g., Timmis, supra note 154, at 226-31 (arguing that because of the expense of developing 
biologics, long exclusivity periods for reference product and first interchangeable, and difficulty of 
obtaining interchangeable designation, the Biologics Act is unlikely to decrease biologic drugs prices to 
the degree that Congress intended).  
 165. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Knockoffs of Biotech Drugs Bring Paltry Savings, WALL ST. J. (May 
5, 2016) at A1, available at http://www.wsj.com/article_email/knockoffs-of-biotech-drugs-bring-paltry-
savings-1462458209-lMyQjAxMTA2NDA1NTkwNDU2Wj. 
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2.  Infectious Diseases (QDIP)  
Coming on the heels of the Biologics Act and in the same Congress as the America 
Invents Patent Reform Act, the 112th Congress also approved Regulatory Property 
intended to promote the development and production of drugs to treat so-called 
“super bugs” that are resistant to ordinary antibiotics.  Thus, the rights are granted 
for antibacterial or antifungal drugs intended to treat serious or life-threatening 
infections.166 
Regulatory Property for infectious diseases overflows with acronyms.  The bill 
was called the GAIN Act, an abbreviation for “Generating Antibiotic Incentives 
Now,” and the program is known as QDIP, an abbreviation for “Qualified Infectious 
Disease Products.”167  Perhaps the acronyms were an attempt to mimic the public 
relations value of the term “orphan” in the wildly successful Orphan Drug Act, 
although nothing can quite recapture that magic. 
The notion of overflowing also is appropriate to the infectious disease legislation 
because the program follows a pattern of just adding more.  Once a drug is designated 
as a qualified infectious disease product, the various Regulatory Property benefits for 
the drug are extended by five years.168  Thus, the four or five-year data rights a drug 
may have if it is a new chemical entity are extended five years to reach a new total 
of nine or ten years.  The three-year data rights a drug may have for performing new 
clinical trials for improvements on existing drugs (new dosages or new indications) 
are extended for five years to reach a new total of eight years.  And the seven-year 
marketing rights a drug may have if it is an orphan drug are extended five years to 
reach a new total of twelve years.  The legislation also granted various other benefits 
for qualified infectious disease products, including fast track approval at the FDA, 
priority review, and the type of “all hands on board” regulatory assistance enjoyed 
by orphan drug developers.169  
3.  Pediatric Studies 
The 112th Congress passed one additional law regarding a form of Regulatory 
Property related to pediatric drug studies.  Regulatory Property for pediatric drug 
studies was originally created by Congress in 1997 as part of the Food & Drug 
Administration Modernization Act, but it had a sunset provision that had been 
extended twice to an ending date of 2012.170  The 112th Congress reauthorized the 
provision, making it permanent.171 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 166. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 801, 126 
Stat. 993, 1077 (2012) (introducing 21 U.S.C. § 505E). 
 167. See id.; see Thomas, supra note 32, at 10. 
 168. See 21 U.S.C. § 505E(a); see Thomas, supra note 32, at 11. 
 169. See sources cited supra note 139; Peter Winter, Antibiotics Resistance Rising; Can New Drugs 
Keep Pace?, BIOWORLD, https://perma.cc/L32W-ZCWJ. 
 170. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 493 (3d ed. 2015); see Policy Framework 
for BPCA and PREA in SAFE AND EFFECTIVE MEDICINES FOR CHILDREN: PEDIATRIC STUDIES 
CONDUCTED UNDER THE BEST PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT AND THE PEDIATRIC RESEARCH 
EQUITY ACT (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat eds. 2012), https://perma.cc/2862-33PE. 
 171. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 10. 
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With the 1997 start date, the pediatric drug study rights show that Regulatory 
Property has been created outside of these two major waves.  The pediatric drug 
study law is grouped with the 112th Congress for this Article, however, given that 
the law was extended during that wave of Regulatory Property activity. 
Pediatric clinical trials are more difficult to perform, with problems including 
complexity of informed consent, changes that occur as children grow, and the 
difficulty of obtaining accurate and reliable data from children.172  As a result, few 
drugs on the market have been formally tested in children, and doctors lack reliable 
information on safety and efficacy in this patient population.  Congress responded to 
these concerns with the creation of a new basket form of Regulatory Property 
intended to encourage companies to perform pediatric clinical trials.  The Regulatory 
Property is granted when a company completes clinical studies of the effects of a 
drug on children.173 
Regulatory Rights for pediatric studies have an oddly chameleon-like nature.  
They can take the form of either marketing rights, data rights, or both.  Specifically, 
the legislation provides that when a company completes pediatric studies, the 
company will receive a six-month extension of its patent rights and/or its various 
forms of exclusivity.  Thus, a company’s orphan drug marketing rights are extended 
for six months along with its new chemical entity data rights are extended for six 
months.174  If a company has both patent rights and exclusivities, each one is 
separately extended for six months.175  For drugs that have no patent or exclusivity, 
Congress in 2002 amendments created a system in which the FDA would award 
contracts to companies willing to engage in pediatric studies.  The provision 
appropriated $200 million to pay for these contracts.176 
The patent extension for pediatric studies does not operate directly as any 
alteration to the patent at the Patent & Trademark Office.  Rather, it operates as a 
marketing right, in which the FDA may not approve another drug with the same 
active ingredient until six months after the original company’s patent expires. 
Although six months is not a particularly long period of time, the pediatric study 
rights have aspects that greatly enhance their value.  For example, the pediatric rights 
apply to all formulations and uses of the drug, including those for adults.  This 
expansive application stands in contrast to the rights granted for orphan drugs, rights 
that apply only for the particular active ingredient and indication of the drug.  Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 172. See id. at 9. 
 173. The FDA must request that a company perform clinical studies, but companies can ask to 
receive such a request.  See Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity Under Section 505A of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Frequently Asked Questions on Pediatric Exclusivity (505A), The Pediatric 
“Rule,” and Their Interaction, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter “FDA FAQs”], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DevelopmentResources/ucm077915.htm?sour
ce=govdelivery&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=govdelivery. 
 174. See Lal, supra note 47, at 2. 
 175. See FDA FAQs, supra note 173.  For drugs that have no patent or exclusivity, Congress in 2003 
amendments created a system in which the FDA would award contracts to companies willing to engage 
in pediatric studies.  The provision appropriated $200 million to pay for these contracts.  
 176. See BPCA § 3(3)(a)(2) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 284m(a)(2) (West 2003)); I. Glen Cohen, 
Therapeutic Orphans, Pediatric Victims: The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and Existing 
Pediatric Human Subject Protection, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 660, 668 (2003). 
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while a new use patent could be limited to a particular use of the drug, if the company 
carried out pediatric studies, the FDA could not grant approval to new competitor to 
make the same drug for any use in any population during the extended period. 
Six months may not sound like much, but the right can be worth a great deal.  
Successful drugs bring in hundreds of millions of dollars a year, and so-called 
Blockbuster drugs bring in more than a billion dollars a year.177  Thus, the ability to 
keep all others out of the market for an additional six months can be extraordinarily 
valuable.178  
In addition, the six-month right can be strung together with other rights to enhance 
the overall value.  For example, a company could make a qualified infectious disease 
product (five years of data rights) that qualifies as a new chemical entity (five years 
of data rights) and do pediatric studies on the drug (six months of extension).  
Although each program alone looks relatively small, added together, the company 
would have ten-and-a-half years of data exclusivity.179 
The pediatric studies program has, indeed, encouraged numerous companies to 
conduct clinical studies of safety and efficacy in children.  It is unclear, however, 
whether the breadth of the rights is proportionate to the societal benefits.  With most 
Regulatory Property, a company receives benefits in exchange for success, that is, 
when a drug is approved or a new chemical or use is identified.  In contrast, 
companies receive the pediatric study rights even when the studies are not successful 
in demonstrating safety and efficacy in children, although even negative effects can 
be used to add warning, contraindications and precautions to the label.180  In addition, 
scholars have raised concerns that the benefits have created a “race to the bottom” 
because they do not require that the studies have been conducted according to 
commonly accepted scientific and ethical standards.181 
4.  Rare Pediatric Diseases 
In the realm of benefits for pediatric diseases, the 112th Congress created an 
additional form of benefit.  As part of the Food and Drug Safety Administration Act 
of 2012, Congress created a program in which companies that receive approval for 
drugs to treat certain rare pediatric diseases receive a voucher for priority review of 
the drug at the FDA.182  This voucher can be used for priority review of another drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 177. See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 40, and text accompanying notes 16-19 (discussing the 
value of delaying generic entry by six months in the context of pay-for-delay settlements); Herder, supra 
note 92, at 242 (defining blockbuster drugs).  
 178. See text accompanying notes 196-197, infra (explaining tradeable rights that merely accelerate 
FDA approval by four months, and describing sales of those rights for $125 million and $350 million); 
see also Cohen, supra note 176, at 665-66 (noting that for ten of the first 36 drugs to receive pediatric 
study rights had sales that exceeded $200 million in six months, with two of them exceeding $800 million 
and two exceeding $1 billion). 
 179. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 11 (setting out this example). 
 180. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 10. 
 181. See Cohen, supra note 176, at 661. 
 182. See P.L. No. 112-144, § 908 (2012) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 360ff).  The notion of priority 
vouchers was initially proposed in the following academic article:  David Ridley, Henry Gabowsli, & 
Jeffery Moe, Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2006), available at 
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by the same company or sold to another company.183 
With the voucher, the FDA is obligated to review a company’s application for 
approval of a new drug within six months.184  For traditional reviews, the FDA 
typically takes at least ten months or more.  Although expediting review by as little 
as four months may not sound like much, the vouchers are highly valued. Studies 
estimate that the vouchers are worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and, in fact, 
AbbVie recently purchased one for $350 million.185  
Although the program for pediatric priority review vouchers was reauthorized in 
2013, a Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report on the program in 2015 
noted that FDA officials do not support continuation of the program.186  The officials 
expressed concern that the transferable nature of the vouchers interferes with the 
agency’s ability to set public health priorities in reviewing treat serious conditions or 
provide significant improvements in safety or efficacy.187  
For example, in theory, a company could buy a voucher for a drug that has 
minimal public benefit in that it represented only minor differences over existing 
treatments.  The drug might have great benefit to the company, however, if it could 
be combined with other exclusivities and life cycle management techniques to secure 
market position in a widely used product.188  The company could then jump to the 
front of the line, passing over drugs that show significant benefits for health 
priorities. 
Regardless of the level of invention or health priorities, tradeable vouchers can be 
used as a competitive tool to beat other pharmaceutical companies to market.  For 
example, the pharmaceutical company Sanofi used a pediatric priority review 
voucher to beat its competitor in a race to first market a new form of cholesterol 
drug.189  Sanofi’s competitor was able to reach the market first in Europe, but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/2/313.abstract; see also Alexander Gaffney & Michael Mezher, 
Regulatory Explainer: Everything You Need to Know About FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers, 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS SOCIETY (July 2, 2015) (crediting Grabowski et. al. with the idea 
for priority vouchers and describing the system), available at http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2015/07/02/21722/Regulatory-Explainer-Everything-You-Need-to-Know-About-
FDA%E2%80%99s-Priority-Review-Vouchers/. 
 183. Id. 
 184. The FDA has asserted that the voucher programs do not guarantee review within that period of 
time, but only that the drug can be entered into the group entitled to expedited review of which the FDA 
must complete 90% of them in the time specified.  See Gaffney & Mezher, supra note 182 (citing 
Guidance for Industry Tropical Disease Priority Review Vouchers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 6 (2008), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/UCM080599.pdf). 
 185. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases—The Trouble with FDA 
Review Vouchers, 359 N. ENGL. J. OF MED. 1981 (2008) (discussing the value of priority vouchers for 
tropical diseases); Chelsey Dulaney, United Therapeutics Sells Priority-Review Voucher to AbbVie for 
$350 Million, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2015), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/united-therapeutics-
sells-priority-review-voucher-to-abbvie-for-350-million-1439981104. 
 186. Rare Diseases: Too Early to Gauge Effectiveness of FDA’s Pediatric Voucher Program, 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Mar. 2016) (overview) (hereinafter “GAO Report”). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 170-78 (describing product hopping techniques); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 40, at 527-33 (describing product hopping techniques and using weak follow-on 
patents, forms of “evergreening”). 
 189. Use of Rare Pediatric Disease Priority Review Voucher; Approval of a Drug Product, FOOD & 
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priority voucher allowed Sanofi to jump ahead in the U.S.190  Sales of this new class 
of drugs are expected to reach into billions of dollars a year, and the first company 
to reach the market in the U.S. usually enjoys sales and marketing momentum, as 
well as advantages in the payment and reimbursement system.191  
The GAO report concluded that it is too soon to gauge the effectiveness of priority 
vouchers for rare pediatric diseases.192  The program is set to expire in 2016.193 
In short, the Regulatory Property created for pediatric studies and rare pediatric 
diseases follows the pattern of all of the Regulatory Property created by the 112th 
Congress in 2011-2012.  The pattern can be described simply as adding more.  
C.  PROLIFERATION—BEYOND PASSAGE OF THE MAJOR GENERIC REGIMES 
The two sections above chronicled the myriad benefits created at the same time 
as Congress passed the two major generic regimes.  In addition, other forms of 
Regulatory Property have begun to proliferate.  Some of these are simply extensions 
or adjustments of the existing regimes described above.194  In 2014, for example, the 
FDA expanded its definition of new chemical entity to include drugs that have a 
combination of active ingredients, as long as the FDA has not previously granted 
approval to at least one active ingredient.195  The FDA’s definition was further 
expanded in 2015—granting new chemical entity status to isolated components of a 
drug when the FDA had previously approved the full mixture—when a court vacated 
and remanded an administrative decision to the contrary.196 
 Entirely new regimes and proposed regimes are popping up, as well.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
DRUG ADMIN. NOTICE (Aug. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/VN39-D3AU; Alexander J. Varond, Priority 
Review Voucher Updates: Valuation, Eligibility, Reauthorization, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 30, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/MM89-67JM. 
 190. See European Commission Approves Amgen’s New Cholesterol-Lowering Medication 
RepathaTM (evolocumab), The First PCSK9 Inhibitor To Be Approved in the World, for Treatment of High 
Cholesterol, AMGEN (July 21, 2015), http://investors.amgen.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61656&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=2069405; Varond, supra note 189. 
 191. Varond, supra note 189. 
 192. See GAO Report, supra note 186. 
 193. Id. at 2 n.3. 
 194. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 83-84; see Thomas, supra note 32, at 9-10 (describing 
amendments to the pediatric studies legislation); Cohen, supra note 176 (same).  In the same vein, in 2015 
Congress passed the Improving Regulatory Transparency for New Medical Therapies Act, which was 
signed into law later that year.  The Act relates to drugs that are regulated by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) because of their potential for abuse and ensures that the exclusivity periods of 
new drugs potentially subject to the DEA program are not delayed by the time it takes for the DEA to 
make a scheduling decision.  See Improving Regulatory Transparency for New Medical Therapies Act, 
H.R. 639, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 195. See David Hoffmeister et al., New Exclusivity for Fixed-Dose Drugs Will Help Small Cos., 
LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/Y59H-PLB7 (citing Guidance for Industry: New Chemical 
Entity Determinations for Certain Fixed-Combination Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 7 (Feb. 
21, 2014), https://perma.cc/K6W3-7B2R. 
 196. See Hoffmeister et al., supra note 54 (discussing the change in apparent response to the District 
Court for the District of Columbia’s ruling regarding Amarin’s drug Vascepa); Amarin Pharm. Ir. Ltd. v. 
FDA, 106 F. Supp. 3d 196 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, 40 COLUM. L.J. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
90 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [40:1	  
1.  Tropical Diseases 
Although somewhat of an outlier, the tropical disease voucher program follows 
the same pattern of passage at the same time as legislation that would restrict a drug 
company’s ability to block generic entry.  Specifically, in 2007, Congress passed 
legislation limiting the ability of brand-name drug companies to use the citizen 
petition process at the FDA to obstruct generic entry.197  The tropical disease voucher 
program passed in the same year. 
The example is somewhat of an outlier, given that the citizen petition anti-abuse 
provisions were part of a larger set of amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, which contained other provisions supported by the pharmaceutical industry.198  
Nevertheless, once again when Congress passed legislation to help generic entry, it 
also passed legislation with new pharmaceutical exclusivities.  
Thus, similar to the priority vouchers for pediatric studies, Congress approved 
another set of tradeable vouchers as part of amendments to the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act in 2007.199  These vouchers are given for approval of neglected tropical 
diseases that disproportionately affect poor populations in developing countries.200  
The legislation lists specific diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, leishmaniasis and 
others, and both Congress and the FDA have added more diseases to the list across 
time.201 
Tradeable vouchers, whether for tropical diseases or for rare pediatric conditions, 
can garner sky-high prices on the open market.  For example, in 2014, Knight 
Therapeutics sold a voucher to Gilead for $125 million.202  Similarly, in 2015, United 
Therapeutics sold a voucher to AbbVie for $350 million.203  These eye-popping 
numbers offer a glimpse of the value of the Regulatory Property that Congress has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 197. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) 
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Michael Carrier and Daryl Wander, Citizen 
Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 263 (2012) (discussing testimony of Senator 
Edward Kennedy that, “[t]he citizen petition provision is designed to address attempts to derail generic 
drug approvals. Those attempts, when successful, hurt consumers and the public health”) 153 CONG. REC. 
25,047 (2007).  For a discussion of the legislation and an empirical analysis of its failure to stop the 
targeted behavior, see Robin C. Feldman, Evan Frondorf, & Andrew K. Cordova, Empirical Evidence of 
Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833151. 
 198. See Jeffrey L. Fox, New Law broadens FDA safety authority, renews user fees, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1189-90 (2007) http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v25/n11/full/nbt1107-1189.html 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2016).  
 199. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, § 1102 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 
524) (2007)). 
 200. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases—The Trouble with FDA 
Review Vouchers, 359 N. ENGL. J. OF MED. 1981-83 (2008). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Knight Sells Priority Review Voucher to Gilead, KNIGHT (Nov. 19, 2014) 
https://perma.cc/TZX6-X5K8 (noting sale of voucher obtained through tropical disease program);  see 
also Ed Silverman, How Much? Gilead Pays $125M For an FDA Priority Review Voucher, WALL ST. J.  
(Nov. 19, 2014), https://perma.cc/CL2C-PETG.  
 203. United Therapeutics Corporation Agrees to Sell Priority Review Voucher to AbbVie for $350 
Million, UNITED THERAPEUTICS (Aug. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/6328-6JJ7 (noting sale of voucher 
obtained through rare pediatric disease program); see also Dulaney, supra note 185.  
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been continually creating for the past thirty years.  One must ask who is paying the 
bill in the end, and most likely it is the purchaser.  The hundreds of millions of dollars 
a company spends to jump the approval line are folded into the eventual price of the 
drug, or into the price of other drugs the company gets to market.  
In analyzing the economic effects of vouchers, it is important to note that spending 
high sums to acquire these vouchers—whether one develops a drug for a favored 
category or purchases a voucher from another company—is a form of a gamble.  The 
voucher may bring a speedier response, but it does not guarantee the FDA will 
approve the drug.  For example, Novartis used a voucher to accelerate review of its 
biologic drug for the treatment of gouty arthritis, but the FDA denied approval of the 
drug.204  Any sums that a company spends to try to get various drugs to market are 
likely to be folded into pharmaceutical prices.  If the drug is successful, the cost will 
be folded into the price of that drug; if the drug is unsuccessful, the cost will be folded 
into the price of other drugs the company brings to market.205  One might ask whether 
it makes good policy sense to create a system that encourages companies to drive up 
drug prices as they gamble on efforts to beat each other to market. 
Only a limited number of vouchers have been granted, and the legislation 
specifically limits the number of some types.206  These vouchers can be sold and 
resold an unlimited number of times, however, which amplifies the size of the 
secondary market for vouchers and the potential economic effects.207 
The tropical disease voucher program caused a flurry of concern, featuring 
pharmaceutical bad boy, Martin Shkreli.  Shkreli initially enraged lawmakers and 
commentators as CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals when the company raised the price 
of an antimalarial drug used for treatment of infections in HIV patients from $13.50 
per pill to $750 per pill.208  In the case of tropical diseases, Shkreli lead a group of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 204. See Gaffney & Mezher, supra note 182. 
 205. In explaining drug pricing and the need to recoup costs, pharmaceutical companies and industry 
groups frequently fold the cost of unsuccessful drug attempts into the cost of drugs that finally succeed.  
See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 12, at 11 (explaining that the oft quoted price tag for successful drug 
development of $800,000 - $1 billion includes a “risk premium” to recoup the costs of failed drug profits 
and failed clinical tests); Wayne Winegarden, The Economics of Pharmaceutical Pricing, PACIFIC 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE 17 (2014), https://perma.cc/QH7Y-FNCJ (noting how only two out of ten marketed 
drugs result in revenue that exceeds research and development costs, resulting in high drug prices to 
recoup costs); Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 
2015), https://perma.cc/3RZ7-5PS7	   (citing an official from the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America as saying that, due to money spent on failed drugs, it is misleading to look only 
at the development costs for one drug); Ben Hirschler, GlaxoSmithKline Boss Says New Drugs can be 
Cheaper, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/K3SG-TW44	   (quoting chief executive of 
GlaxoSmithKline as saying that the one billion dollar price tag claimed for development of one drug is 
“one of the great myths of the industry” since it includes money spent on drugs that fail).   
 206. For an easily accessible explanation of the voucher systems along with lists of the vouchers 
granted through summer of 2015, see Gaffney & Mezher, supra note 182. 
 207. Originally, rare pediatric drug vouchers could be re-traded, but tropical disease vouchers could 
only be sold once.  A 2014 Congressional amendment to the tropical disease program clarified that the 
legislation allowed for unlimited transfers.  See Adding Ebola to the FDA Priority Review Voucher 
Program Act, S. 2917, 113th Cong. (2014); Gaffney & Mezher, supra note 182. 
 208. See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 40, and text accompanying notes 193-206 (describing the 
Turing saga and techniques the company used to improperly block competition).  Shkreli later resigned 
his post as CEO of Turing after being arrested on charges of securities fraud for activities at a prior 
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investors who purchased a company with rights to a drug used to treat Chagas 
disease, which is caused by a parasite and is found most commonly in South and 
Central America.209  Although the drug is already in common use in those countries, 
it has never been approved for sale in the United States.  Shkreli set out his intent to 
apply for FDA approval of the drug in the United States, garner a tradeable voucher, 
and then sell that voucher.  If the move is successful, the company would receive a 
voucher in exchange for a drug that is already being widely used to treat the particular 
tropical disease. 
The idea of garnering Regulatory Property with old medicines is not unique to 
Martin Shkreli or to the tropical disease voucher program.  For example, one of the 
original forms of Regulatory Property was created for approval of new chemical 
entities.210  The legislative language refers to the introduction of entities whose active 
ingredients have not been approved by the FDA and references the original Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.211  As a result, drugs whose active ingredients have 
been used in medication since before that time can be introduced as “new” chemical 
entities, thereby receiving the benefits. 
Other forms of Regulatory Property have emerged either through Congressional 
legislation or FDA mandate.  
2.  Unapproved Drugs 
In a form of amnesty proposal, the FDA launched an initiative to encourage those 
who make old drugs—those that have been sold since before implementation of the 
current FDA drug approval process—to come in from the cold.212  At least one 
company working with the FDA under the Unapproved Drug Initiative, was able to 
garner significant exclusivities and market advantage.  Specifically, the maker of an 
old gout remedy, colchicine, received three years of data rights for new clinical 
studies that consisted, in part, of one week of testing 185 patients at a reduced 
dosage.213  The reduced dosage had been recommended by one of the major 
rheumatology societies as well as in a study published by researchers twenty years 
before.214 
In addition to benefits for “new” clinical studies, the company also received seven 
years of marketing rights as an orphan drug indication for the treatment of a familial 
Mediterranean fever.215  As described above, drugs do not need to be new in order to 
receive benefits for an orphan drug indication, and coming in from the cold allowed 
the company to benefit from that provision, as well.  As a final happy circumstance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
company.  See Robert Langreth, Shkreli Resigns as Turing CEO After Arrest on Securities Fraud, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/D3DM-5GS6. 
 209. See Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Latest Plan to Sharply Raise Drug Prices Prompts 
Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/TK25-77FR. 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79. 
 211. See 21 CFR § 314.108(a) (2012). 
 212. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 12. 
 213. See Kesselheim & Solomon, supra note 102. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
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for the company, the FDA announced its intention to act against other unapproved 
makers of the product.216  As the sole remaining provider, the company raised its 
price from $.09 a pill to $4.85 per pill.217  Scholars projected that with the price 
increase, Medicare and Medicaid spending alone would rise from $1 million a year 
on the drug to $50 million a year.218  
The FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative does not create its own form of 
Regulatory Property, but the agency can use the program in ways that are quite 
helpful for applicants in gaining rights. In short, coming in from the cold can prove 
quite warm and lovely, indeed.  
3.  The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The proliferation of Regulatory Property has not been confined within the 
boundaries of the U.S.  There have also been efforts to expand the web of regulatory 
exclusivities abroad, offering monopoly protection to U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies in their international dealings.  Such efforts have been showcased in 
recent negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”).  As the TPP 
developed, American drug makers fought hard to take the exclusivities they have 
enjoyed at home and directly export them overseas.219  They largely succeeded, 
receiving several favorable provisions in the TPP’s 75-page intellectual property 
chapter, such as five years of data exclusivity for new chemical entities and three 
years of protection for new clinical studies.220  U.S. data and marketing exclusivities 
were not adopted into the TPP agreement without resistance, however. In particular, 
the length of data protection for new biologics became a source of great 
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   (describing a letter and white paper submitted to the U.S. Trade 
Representative urging strong intellectual property protection, including twelve year data protection for 
biological products); Adam Behsudi & Brett Norman, Big Pharma seeks special trade deal, POLITICO 
(June 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/CF7U-N9QR. 
 220. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, at 18-26, https://perma.cc/DGG4-VCSP; see also Baker, supra 
note 12, at 3.  
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controversy.221  As described previously, the period of data rights afforded to original 
biologic drug makers in the U.S. is unusually long:  twelve years, and the marketing 
protection portion is four years.222  Industry representatives pushed hard in TPP for 
twelve years of full marketing protection.223  Opponents sought a much shorter period 
of five years, concerned about the potential for long protection periods to stymie 
access to much-needed medications in poor and developing countries.224  Eventually, 
after several years of debate, a compromise of eight years was reached.225  This 
includes five years of actual protection and the potential that the final three years 
could be satisfied if market conditions are such that protection is conferred. 
Depending on how one looks at it, the TPP could be considered either longer or 
shorter than US protection for biologics.  Comparing pure marketing protection to 
pure marketing protection, the TPP is longer.  U.S. marketing protection for biologics 
is only four years while the TPP is eight. 
If one looks at total protection from all sources, however, protection is shorter for 
biologics in the TPP than in the US.  The total U.S. protection, including data rights, 
is twelve years, while the total TPP protection is eight years.  The question may turn 
on the extent to which one believes there is any difference between data rights and 
marketing rights. If the two are equivalent, then TPP is weaker.  If one believes 
marketing rights are stronger, then the TPP has longer protection that the U.S.—eight 
years rather than four.  
Part of the difficulty in achieving consensus among TPP members stems from the 
wide variations in domestic policy on Regulatory Property.  While some countries, 
such as Canada and Australia, have regimes somewhat similar to that of the U.S., 
other countries, like Vietnam and Malaysia, have much weaker protections or no 
protection at all.226  That the U.S. has perhaps the most extensive and powerful 
Regulatory Property regime of all TPP countries speaks to the power of the domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 221. The protection for biologics was particularly contentious because it was a novel proposition, 
outside of the norm in length, and considered to be unnecessary to create incentives for innovation.  See 
Tim Fernholz, Under the TPP, America’s insanely high drug prices will be an unappreciated export, 
QUARTZ (Nov. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/D8TX-9ZPE.  Though nearly all recent U.S. free trade 
agreements contain intellectual property protections, and many contain marketing/data exclusivities of 
some kind, the inclusion of an extended period of protection for biologics was a first.  See Lee Branstetter, 
TPP and the Conflict Over Drugs: Incentives for Innovation Versus Access to Medicines, in ASSESSING 
THE TRANS-PACIFIC P’SHIP VOLUME 2: INNOVATIONS IN TRADING RULES 20, 22 (Jeffrey J. Schott & 
Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs eds. 2016), https://perma.cc/5WWS-TZ89. 
 222. See Biologics Act, supra notes 146-55. 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 219.  
 224. Branstetter, supra note 221, at 21; Lisa De Bode, Trade deal is a big win for Big Pharma, health 
rights advocates say, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/HNM2-DK9B (quoting Doctor 
Without Borders calling TPP “the worst trade agreement for access to medicines in developing countries” 
in history).  
 225. Technically, the TPP guarantees a baseline of five years of standard data protection, with a 
provision allowing countries to use “other measures” to satisfy the three additional years of market 
protection.  See Robert A. Rogowsky, Intellectual Property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 22 BROWN 
J. WORLD AFFAIRS 123, 131; Baker, supra note 12, at 4.  
 226. See Ryan Davis, TPP Aims to Spread US-Style IP Protections Overseas, LAW360 (Nov. 5, 
2015), https://perma.cc/CD56-94XP; Rogowsky, supra note 225, at 132.  
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pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries in influencing legislative activity.227  In 
fact, lingering frustration over failure to achieve a twelve-year provision may 
jeopardize passage of the TPP in the U.S. Congress.228  Given the trend of new forms 
of Regulatory Property materializing in response to industry discontent, drug 
companies’ disappointment with the outcome of TPP negotiations229 may portend 
further expansion of Regulatory Property within the U.S. 
4.  Proposals: Abuse-Deterrent Opioids, Combination Therapies, Dormant 
Therapies, Diagnostic Tests  
As Regulatory Property becomes increasingly popular, numerous new forms are 
being proposed by legislators.  The most recent bill relates to abuse-deterrent opioids 
and is called the COMBAT Act.  Following the “just add more” pattern, the bill 
would add one year to the three-year data rights for new clinical studies for abuse-
deterrent opioids.230  It would also add two months to the marketing rights for first 
filing generic drugs (with a patent challenge to the branded drug) that are abuse-
deterrent opioids, increasing that benefit from six months to eight months.231  
Other bills have appeared recently in Congress without passage, although they 
could be resurrected in the future.  These have included the Life-Threatening 
Diseases Compassion Through Combination Therapy Act of 2012, which would 
have extended by six months any Regulatory Property granted to the company for 
the drug.232   
Taking a different approach, the MODDERN Cures Act, which stands for the 
Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures 
Act,233 would shift the emphasis for pharmaceutical companies away from the patent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 227. See Thomas J. Bollyky, A Dose of TPP’s Medicine: Why U.S. Trade Deals Have Not Exported 
U.S. Drug Prices, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS WORKING PAPER (2016), at Table 1, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755754 (charting out existing pharmaceutical rules 
in the TPP countries and visually demonstrating the extent of U.S. protections compared to others).  
 228. See Rogowsky, supra note 225, at 125 (noting strong rejection of the TPP by Republicans in 
Congress due to failure to obtain biologics concession) and at 132 (noting that Senator Orrin Hatch has 
established that he will oppose the TPP if it does not include twelve-year exclusivity for biologics); Susan 
Cornwell, House Speaker Ryan: No point in lame duck vote on TPP deal, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/Z4CD-HYKS (describing House Speaker Paul Ryan’s comment that the Obama 
administration has to “renegotiate some pieces” of the TPP, including the biologics provision, “if they 
have any hope or chance of passing it”).  
 229. Nicole Gray & Sy Mukherjee, TPP trade deal reached, BIO & PhRMA unhappy with drug 
patent compromise, BIOPHARMADIVE (Oct. 5, 2015), http://perma.cc/2KDW-QHUX; BIO Statement on 
Data Exclusivity Provisions Within the Trans-Pacific Partnership, BIO: BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
ORGANIZATION (Oct. 4, 2015), http://perma.cc/VL3Q-JTVZ (quoting BIO President and CEO Jim 
Greenwood, “We are very disappointed in reports from Atlanta that suggest Trade Ministers have failed 
to include 12 years of data exclusivity for biologics in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.”).  
 230. See Curb Opioid Misuse by Advancing Technology Act of 2016, H.R. 5127, 114th Cong. § 
2(a) (2016).  
 231. See id. 
 232. See Life-Threatening Diseases Compassion through Combination Therapy Act of 2012, H.R. 
6502, 112th Cong. (2012).  
 233. See Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostic Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act of 
2013, H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. (2013).  
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system and toward Regulatory Property.234  The bill, which has been reintroduced in 
various forms since 2011,235 would provide fifteen years of marketing rights for 
certain drugs.236  Companies could opt into the system, but would have to relinquish 
patent rights that extend past the fifteen years.237  Criticisms of the proposal include 
concerns that a company would only have to relinquish prior patent rights, not patents 
granted after FDA approval.238  This would allow for continuation of life-cycle 
management techniques in which companies file for patents on new uses, methods 
of manufacture, and variations of a drug in order to extend the time in which the drug 
is protected by patents.239 
Finally, one commentator has suggested that legislators in 2016 will consider a 
bill to grant Regulatory Property for diagnostic tests.240  In addition to legislative 
proposals, scholars have advanced numerous proposals to create various forms of 
Regulatory Property for aspects of the pharmaceutical industry.  These have included 
ones for new uses of existing drugs, 241 product safety testing after FDA approval,242 
human gene sequences,243 ideas described in academic research papers,244 as well as 
doubling the length of all Hatch-Waxman data and marketing rights to achieve ten to 
fourteen years of protection.245  
In short, numerous forms of Regulatory Property have been created over the last 
thirty years.  Moreover, members of Congress and the FDA increasingly reach for 
Regulatory Property as a solution to various problems.  For a chart summarizing each 
of the existing forms, see Appendix A. 
As society creates this complex web of regulatory benefits, it is important to 
analyze where the costs fall and whether we have confidence that the programs are 
sufficiently operating in the service of the intended goals.  Approaching these 
questions, however, requires understanding how all of these various benefits interact 
with each other as they are linked together like the complex biological/disease 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 234. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 13; see also Morris, supra note 51.  
 235. See, e.g., Dormant Therapies Act of 2014, S. 3004, 113th Cong. (2013); MODDERN Cures 
Act of 2013, H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 236. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 13. 
 237. See id.  
 238. See Senators Call for 15 Years of Marketing Exclusivity for Some New Drugs, REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Dec. 12, 2014), http://perma.cc/7FBF-8BNY. 
 239. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 19, at 70-77 (describing evergreening techniques); C. Scott 
Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336 (2012) (testing evergreening theories through data on 
generic entry and finding that lower quality later expiring patents disproportionately draw patent 
challenges). 
 240. See Hoffmeister, et al., supra note 54.  
 241. See Eisenberg, supra note 125. 
 242. See Leslie Kushner, Note, Incentivizing PostMarketing Pharmaceutical Products Safety 
Testing with Extension of Exclusivity Periods, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 519, 519-
20. (2009). 
 243. See Dolin, supra note 51. 
 244. See Eller, supra note 122. 
 245. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 503, 564-68 (2009). 
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processes society hopes to treat.246  Only by conceptualizing the entire group as a 
single, interrelated organism can we hope to analyze and evaluate the cost, impact, 
and effectiveness of the Regulatory Property society continually grants. 
III.  CONCEPTS FOR A UNIFIED WHOLE 
As outlined in the section above, society has created the system of Regulatory 
Property by accretion.  Rather than having a coherent conceptual plan, Congress has 
added individual pieces here and there across time, often in conjunction with 
legislation that was difficult for the pharmaceutical industry to swallow.  The result 
is a tangled beast that is at various points quasi-patent, quasi-trade secret, and quasi-
property.  
What can be made of the strange nature of Regulatory Property?  Does its variable 
form provide a more efficient method of surgically targeting the evolving problems 
of incentivizing life science innovation?247  Or does its variability simply enhance 
the negative externalities created by the system, whether those externalities are (1) 
economic loss from the transaction costs of an enormously complex system; (2) loss 
of oversight by legislators, competition authorities, and the public due to the system’s 
opacity; or (3) leakage within the system as its complexity allows market actors to 
maneuver a way that undermines society’s intended goals?  
Mismatch between society’s intended goals and the results of the system could 
occur in multiple forms, and the problems can be far more subtle than simple failure 
to incentivize new drugs or treatments.  In some circumstances, society may be 
receiving value through the program, but that value may be insufficient for the 
benefit conferred.  For example, a company may receive an exceedingly valuable 
right in exchange for a minor improvement on existing treatments or the return to a 
company for an innovative advance may, nonetheless, be far greater than Congress 
contemplated.248  Even if the return is appropriate to the cost society is paying, that 
cost may be beyond our societal capacity.  Your family would be far safer if you 
drove them in a Sherman tank, for example, but the cost may not fit comfortably 
within the household budget. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 246. In 2012, the FDA established an Exclusivity Board to engage in oversight and 
recommendations in the interests of clarity and consistency, particularly for individual decisions.  See 
CDER Exclusivity Board, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://perma.cc/DH8A-BBMK.  The Board 
appears to have been established in response to industry concerns about a denial of benefits in a particular 
case.  See Kurst R. Karst, “New” CDER Exclusivity Board Focuses on Clarity and Consistency of 
Exclusivity Decisions, FDA LAW BLOG (Nov. 6, 2012), http://perma.cc/G8FJ-3Y5C. Thus, the Board 
appears more likely to be focused on consistency in granting benefits, rather than having a mandate to ask 
why the exclusivities exist in their current forms. 
 247. Cf. Morris, supra note 51, at 22  (noting that FDA expertise can tailor exclusivities in a way 
that can never be achieved in the one-size-fits-all patent system); see Thomas, supra note 32, at 15 (noting 
that international agreements related to patents such as TRIPS require neutrality with respect to the patent 
system while exclusivities give Congress more flexibility for stimulating particular forms of private 
activity).  
 248. Cf. Reichman, supra note 12, at 43 (expressing concern that exclusivities granted for new 
clinical trials merely generate improvements upon existing technical know-how without adding a new 
inventive step to prior art). 
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In other circumstances, the costs of the new drug may be borne, not by the patients 
who use the drug, but by the patients who use an entirely different drug.  In other 
words, there can be an unintended taxation of people with one type of disease for the 
benefit of people with another type of disease.  For example, when a company 
treating a rare form of cancer transfers a tradeable right to a company treating 
Alzheimer’s disease, the Alzheimer’s company is likely to raise its drug price to 
compensate for buying the voucher.  Thus, the Alzheimer’s patients are partly 
bearing the costs of developing a drug for cancer.  In addition, the value of blocking 
competition for a broad market like Alzheimer’s may be quite great, resulting in a 
super high price for the tradeable voucher such that the return to the cancer drug 
company that far exceeds the value added for the cancer patients.  In that case, one 
has unintended taxation of the hypothetical Alzheimer drug patients combined with 
a benefit for the cancer company that exceeds the value created for society.  
In other circumstances, society may have intended to incentivize exploration into 
new drugs, with all of the spillover benefits that may occur for other diseases when 
new compounds are discovered.  Instead, the program incentivized repurposing of 
existing or extremely old drugs.  
Finally, in some circumstances, a program may be too successful.  Society could 
get the innovation it hoped for in a specialized area of health concern.  Nevertheless, 
the cost could be diversion of energy from other health concerns to an extent far 
greater than anticipated or desired.  Society would be unlikely to approve a diversion 
of all health care research into a single area, for example cancer treatment, yet the 
various programs may, in concert, have that effect.249 
In exploring valuation problems with Regulatory Property, the problem is not with 
the value of each cause.  Drugs for antibiotics-resistant bacteria, cancer treatments, 
and abuse-deterrent opioids are of great value to society.  The problem arises when 
there is a mismatch of the value created with the costs and effectiveness of the various 
programs.  The challenge for analyzing Regulatory Property in this manner involves 
obtaining a clear picture of the costs. 
All of the questions and potential problems outlined above deserve empirical and 
theoretical exploration; recognizing the system as an interconnected whole, however, 
is a prerequisite for those explorations.  Most important, without a coherent 
theoretical framework, one cannot intelligently shape the development of the system 
and test its success.  The remainder of this section provides a general theoretical 
framework for Regulatory Property and suggests benchmarks to use in establishing 
and evaluating it.  Such benchmarks should include:  (1) minimizing overlap with 
other forms of intellectual property; (2) ensuring that the system is capable of 
stimulating results, and that those results are desirable; and (3) ensuring that there is 
a metric for measuring outcomes in relationship to goals. 
In general, the goal of Regulatory Property can be described as promoting the 
development and commercial availability of safe and effective treatments.  Framing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 249. See Daniel et al., supra note 2; see also Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Economics 
of New Oncology Drug Development, 25 J. CLIN. ONCOLOGY 209 (2007) (noting that new oncology drugs 
have a disproportionately high share of FDA priority review ratings, orphan drug designations, and 
inclusion in expedited access programs). 
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the goal in this manner explains, as well as dictates, various aspects of the design.  In 
particular, the goal of safety and efficacy carries with it the need for certain types of 
value judgments that differ from other forms of intellectual property.  Compare 
Regulatory Property with its cousins, patent and trade secret.  The patent system does 
not care about how safe a drug is or how effective it is, only that its workings are 
different from what has come before and that there is some utility.250  The focus is 
on new, not on better or safer, and there is little awareness of the type of societal 
value judgments inherent in safety and efficacy.251  
In fact, the pursuit of safety and efficacy values things that are the antithesis of 
newness.  For example, a safety regime relies on the continued evaluation of patent 
experiences and adverse events in the life of the drug.  Rather than simply pressing 
for new drugs and new treatments, safety considerations place value on more 
experience with and information about existing treatments. 
Trade secret similarly lacks any focus on safety and efficacy.  A trade secret must 
have value to be protected, but that value is contemplated in reference to conferring 
an advantage in the marketplace.252  One might hope that in a rational market, safety 
and efficacy would win out, but that is not necessarily true.  If it were, there would 
be no need for the approval capacity of the FDA.  Moreover, trade secret law values 
numerous categories of secrets unrelated to safety or efficacy, such as customer lists, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 250. See Dennis S. Fernandez et al., The Interface of Patents with the Regulatory Drug Approval 
Process and How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market Entry, in IPHANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 965, 
865-66 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds. 2007), http://perma.cc/W8WS-UVET (noting that patents are granted 
to inventions that are “novel, useful, and nonobvious,” and that the FDA is separately responsible for 
ensuring safety and efficacy); BRUCE LEHMAN, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 7 (2003), http://perma.cc/8EWA-JAD7 (describing patent filing and FDA trials for safety and 
efficacy as two separate, distinct phases).  
 251. Courts have, on occasion in the distant past, denied patentability on the grounds that the 
invention was not “useful” for reasons of morality.  The first articulation of this “moral utility” doctrine 
can be credited to Justice Story, who stated that “all that the law requires is that the invention should not 
be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.  The word ‘useful,’ 
therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”  Lowell v. Lewis, 
15 F. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).  See, e.g., Reliance Novelty Co. v. Dworzek, 80 F. 902, 904 (N.D. 
Cal. 1897) (striking down a patent for a slot machine cover due to lack of utility, based on assumed 
immorality of gambling); Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89-90 (N.D. III. 1889) (finding 
that an invention used only for gambling purposes is not a useful device, within the meaning of patent 
law); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1900) (invalidating patent used to defraud consumers 
into thinking domestic tobacco was expensive, imported tobacco); Mahler v. Animarium Co., 111 F. 530, 
537 (8th Cir. 1901) (denying patent for medical device which claimed to use electricity to cure diseases, 
due to concerns about fraudulence).  Modern courts, however, generally have avoided notions of morality 
in patentability decisions.  See Margo A. Bagley, A Global Controversy: The Role of Morality in 
Biotechnology Patent Law, 320-23 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 57, 2007) (noting how in the late 20th century, courts began refusing to impose the 
moral utility requirement, viewing it as outside the purview of the judiciary); AMY L. LANDERS, 
UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW § 22.04 (2d ed. 2012) (noting the rarity with which moral utility is invoked 
today, and identifying the 1999 Federal Circuit decision in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. as the 
basis).  
 252. Michelle L. Evans, Proof of Facts to Establish Information as Trade Secret Under Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, 139 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 241 § 15 (listing as a requirement to establish that 
certain information is trade secret, “information derives independent economic value, actual or potential 
from its secrecy”).  
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sales techniques, and marketing strategies.253  These vie for attention in building the 
theoretical construct that encompasses trade secret law. 
Thus, the goals of Regulatory Property can be understood as both broader and 
narrower than those for patent and trade secret.  The goals are broader in the sense 
that with Regulatory Property, the focus is on issues generally not contemplated or 
not within the direct sights or even the peripheral vision of patent and trade secret 
laws.  The goals are narrower in the sense that the development of safe and effective 
treatments is the sole focus, rather than any other marketplace advantage or any 
advancements unrelated to life sciences.  This laser focus creates the potential for 
incentives that are far more particularized than intellectual property that must suit all 
types of innovation and serve all types of values.  
Other value judgments lie embedded in the goal of safe and effective treatments.  
Medical treatment often involves tradeoffs that differ from other types of innovation.  
For example, the notion of safety is not an absolute value, and no treatment is 100 
percent safe and effective for all patients in all circumstances.  One must always 
determine what types of risks and side effects are acceptable to treat a particular 
disease state.  This is not the quintessential patent or trade secret analysis. 
An incentive structure keyed to safety and efficacy, along with real-time 
information and cost benefit analyses, must necessarily differ from the more familiar 
structures of other forms of intellectual property.  To accommodate the agility 
required, such a system would need to be shorter, more flexible, and more targeted 
than patent and trade secret.  And such is the general nature of Regulatory Property.   
The greatest danger, however, lies where Regulatory Property overlaps with other 
intellectual property regimes, and it does so in the realm of innovation.  Promoting 
the development of safe and effective treatments includes, of course, the notion of 
promoting development.  Where the regimes rub shoulders against each other, there 
is a risk that each one’s goals and limitations will conflict with the other or that both 
will get lost in the shuffle.  This concern is reflected in the Congressional Research 
Service’s observation that it makes little sense if, in the interests of promoting 
innovation, society denies patent rights to an invention that is too ordinary, but then 
grants similar protection in the context of drug testing.254  Different goals demand 
different types of incentive structures, not simply one tacked onto another. 
Thus, Regulatory Property should not be a matter of granting an extra goody here 
and there.  “Patents plus” or “trade secrets plus” is not a good logic for the regime of 
Regulatory Property.  Nor should it be a way to tinker at the margins with something 
that dissatisfies a particular party or a way of getting a back-door patent.  The benefit 
makes most sense when tethered to the goals of the system and aimed at incentivizing 
activity for which other intellectual property regimes are fundamentally ill-suited.  
There may be market failures, for example, which other regimes cannot address but 
for which Regulatory Property may provide a targeted solution.  In short, frameworks 
that look like just an extension of another regime without all of the requirements are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 253. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (stating that a trade secret 
may “relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business,” including “a list of specialized 
customers”). 
 254. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 13. 
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
2016] REGULATORY PROPERTY:  THE NEW IP 101	  
more likely to be problematic.  The goal should be as little overlap as possible. 
Areas of overlap tend to create problems for intellectual property regimes, in 
general.  They are a signal of unresolved difficulties, not a joyful combination or an 
intersection of ideals.  One can think of them as analogous to “Rough Road Ahead” 
traffic signals.  Consider patent and copyright protection for software; patent, 
copyright, and trademark protection for designs; and the ill-fated Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act (“SCPA”), heralded with fanfare and then promptly ignored.255  
Each of these marks an area of great and continued turmoil.256  Regulatory Property 
will be challenging as well.  As difficult as navigating the boundary may be, however, 
success is critical if there is any hope of meeting the goals of each regime. 
In addition to avoiding overlap with other intellectual property regimes, 
Regulatory Property should be evaluated in terms of whether the programs are 
capable of stimulating results and, most important, that those results are the ones we 
desire.  Specifically, is society clear about its intended results, is the program 
stimulating those results, and is the program, nevertheless, creating intolerable 
externalities such that the program must be adjusted or abandoned?  Consider, for 
example, the Regulatory Property granted for those who engage in pediatric studies.  
Creating incentives for companies to study the effects of medications in children has 
brought a wealth of important and sometimes unexpected knowledge about the 
effectiveness of treatments in that population.257  Nevertheless, scholars have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 255. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping 
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1518 (2004) (discussing problems 
resulting from overlap of design patents, and copyright and trademark for designs, patent/copyright 
overlap in software and in the SCPA); Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection—Integrating Patent, 
Copyright and Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 151 (1987) (noting how the hybrid 
nature of software causes confusion in terms of how best to protect it); Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media 
and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323, 334 
(1990) (noting how digital media, like software, created a new overlap between copyright and utility patent 
law); Stuart J. H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software 
Industry, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 219, 224-31 (2003) (analyzing the 
fluctuating relationship between copyright and patent protection for software); Leon Radomsky, Sixteen 
Years After the Passage of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Is International Protection Working?, 
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049 (2000) (describing how the SCPA was largely obsolete soon after its 
passage and why it has been rarely invoked); Steven P. Kasch, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: 
Past, Present, and Future, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 71 (1992) (noting that despite substantial interest at the 
outset, the Act had generated only one published case eight years after its enactment). 
 256. See Adam Mossoff, A Brief History of Software Patents (And Why They’re Valid) (Center for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property, Working Paper No. 14-41, 2013), http://perma.cc/BL25-DJWS 
(noting how debates about software patents today are “rife with extensive confusion and misinformation”); 
Justin M. Clark & Julianne R. Davis, Pattern Overlay: Do Design Patents and Copyright Protection work 
with—or Against—Each Other?, 6 LANDSLIDE, no. 4, 2014, at 48 (2014) (describing how the recent Apple 
v. Samsung litigation highlights the dysfunctional overlap of design patents with other types of IP 
protection); Thomas Hoeren et al., Breakthrough Technologies—Semiconductor, Innovation, and 
Intellectual Property, 31-33 (WIP,  Working Paper No. 27, 2015), http://perma.cc/32XT-Y2LB 
(describing continuing uncertainty in the IP landscape for semiconductors). 
 257. A Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) Report found that 87% of drugs granted 
pediatric exclusivity under the BCPA underwent significant labeling changes as a result of the pediatric 
studies conducted.  The labeling changes were generally necessitated by findings that children were being 
exposed to ineffective drugs, ineffective dosings, or previously unknown side effects.  For instance, the 
drug Sumatriptan was being used to treat migraines in children, but studies conducted under pediatric 
FELDMAN, REGULATORY PROPERTY: THE NEW IP, 40 COLUM. L.J. & ARTS 53 (2016) 
102 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [40:1	  
questioned whether the rush to obtain this benefit has become a race-to-the-bottom 
in which commonly accepted scientific and ethical protocols are left in the dust.258 
Any form of evaluation requires that there is some metric to examine in 
relationship to the goals.  This means that the program itself should be able to 
articulate its aims in terms of metrics that can be repeatedly tested.  It is not enough 
to articulate a general sense that additional benefits to particular types of actors will 
be good for particular health issues.  Policy makers should identify both the result 
they intend and how they intend to measure progress toward that result.  A system 
designed to be shorter and more nimble than other areas of intellectual property is 
particularly appropriate for evaluative metrics.  
Most important, no evaluative measures are possible without transparency.  
Information on a range of issues, from pricing to the percentage of a drug’s sales that 
are directed towards a desired usage,259 will be critical so that legislators and 
regulators can evaluate the effectiveness of programs on the ground. 
The need for evaluation leads back, once again, to the notion that Regulatory 
Property must be conceptualized as a coherent whole.  The appeal of understanding 
Regulatory Property as a unified system lies beyond the sublime beauty of logical 
consistency in theoretical constructs.  From an instrumental perspective, 
understanding it as an integrated system is essential for evaluating the effectiveness 
of each of the programs individually and of the system as a whole.  With these 
perspectives, society has an opportunity to think critically and cohesively about the 




	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exclusivity found that children were having serious adverse reactions to Sumatriptan, including stroke and 
vision loss – the labeling was changed such that the drug is not recommended for children under 18 years 
old.  See Marcia Cross, Pediatric Drug Research: Studies Conducted under Best Pharmaceuticals for 
Children Act, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-557, PEDIATRIC DRUG RESEARCH:  STUDIES 
CONDUCTED UNDER BEST PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT 1, 18 (2007); see also Mike Mitka, 
FDA Alert on Antidepressants for Youth, 290 JAMA 2534 (2003) (discussing how FDA found a possible 
link between antidepressant drug treatment for pediatric patients and increased suicidal ideation and 
attempts, based on studies conducted under the pediatric exclusivity provision). 
 258. See Cohen, supra note 176, at 661. 
 259. See Daniel et al., supra note 2, at 4 (suggesting that orphan drug act reforms will require 
disclosure of percentage of sales that are for orphan conditions as opposed to non-orphan conditions). 
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APPENDIX A:  SUMMARY CHART OF REGULATORY PROPERTY 
FORMS 






















Waxman	  Act	  &	  1984	  
Orphan	  Drug	  Act	  
Amendments	  
First	  Generic	  Filers	   Marketing	   6	  months	   Patent	   N/A	   No	  
New	  Chemical	  Entities	   Data	   5	  years	  or	  4	  years*	  
Trade	  
Secret	   Yes	  
Yes	  (1-­‐2	  
years)	  
New	  Clinical	  Studies	   Data	   3	  years	   Trade	  Secret	   Yes	   No	  
Orphan	  Drugs	   Marketing	   7	  years	   Patent	   Yes	   No	  
2011	  America	  
Invents	  Act	  &	  
Biologics	  Act	  
First	  Biosimilar	  Filers	   None	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	  
First	  Interchangeable	  




Secret	   N/A	   No	  
Original	  Biologic	  Drug	  
Makers	  
Marketing
***	   4	  years	   Patent	   Yes	   No	  
Data	   12	  years	   Trade	  Secret	   Yes	   No	  
QDIP	  New	  Chemical	  
Entities	   Data	  
+5	  years	  
(total	  9	  or	  
10	  years)	  
Trade	  
Secret	   Yes	  
Yes	  (1-­‐2	  
years)	  
QDIP	  New	  Clinical	  





Secret	   Yes	   No	  




Patent	   Yes	   No	  





Yes	   Depends	  ****	  








Property	   Yes	   N/A	  
2007	  FDA	  








Property	   Yes	   N/A	  
 
*Length is shortened to four years if a generic hopeful files for FDA approval 
certifying its intent to challenge the patent on the drug as invalid, unenforceable, or 
not infringed 
**FDA is not permitted to begin considering a generic hopeful until the right 
expires, so time until a generic enters is longer 
***Designated as a marketing right in this chart because no follow-on company 
may apply 
****Extension is added to prior regulatory right, so depends on nature of prior 
right 
